Lyric analysis: a lacanian reading of Jan Zwicky's poetics by Carpenter, Kyle




LYRIC ANALYSIS: A LACA IAN READII G OF JA ZWICKY'S POETICS
by
Kyle Carpenter
Supervisor: Dr. Noreen Golfinan
A thesis submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfi lment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
English Literature
Memorial University of Newfoundland
April 2011
St. John's. Newfoundland
Acknowledge me nts:
Thanks to Dr. Noreen Golfman for her supervision. Dr. Danine Farquharson
for her support as Graduate Coordinator, and Dr. Chris Lockett for his
encouragement. Special thanks goes to Anthony Chadwick for his help,
expertise, and tutelage in approaching Lacan. This MA thesis was funded
by Memorial's School of Graduate Studies. and the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council's Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada
Graduate Scholarship. Without the help of the above, this work would not
have been completed.
.....44
Carpenter \
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 lntroduction. , .. 2
Chapter 2 On "Freud 's Metaphsychology and the Culture of Philosophy" .. .. 8
2. \ Wittgenstein, Language and Psychoanalysis.. . \5
2.2 rear and Loathing: Post-modernism and Analysis. . . . . 21
Chapter 3 Alienation and "The Emotional Tone of Wisdom'" : . 25
3. \ On Metaphor: Zwicky.. ; .. 25
3.2 On Metaphor: Lacan.. .. 28
3.3 Time in Lyric Form.. .. 33
3.4 Anamnesis and Aesthetic.. .. .. .40
Chapter 4 Lyric Analysis: The End of Development..
4.\ Desire and Fantasy: The Direction of the Treatment .45
4.2 Wisdom, Metaphor, and Living in the World as If It is Home 50
4.3 A Touch of the Divine: Oracularirty and the Tuche 55
Chapter 5 Critical Analysis: Reading Zwicky's Poetry 59
5.1 Wittgenstein Elegies.. . .. ...61
5.2 The New Room.. .. .. 73
5.3 Songs for Relinquishing the Earth 87
Conclusion.. .. .
Bibliography. ..
. 98
.. \01
Carpenter 2
Chapter 1 Introducti on
While Jan Zwicky is recognized as an accomplished and sensitive poet. one of
Canada's finest writers. the body of critical work on her poetry is remarkably scant. Even
though she has won the Governor General's award for her 1995 collection. Songs/ill'
Relinquishing the Earth, genuine critical evaluation of her work has rarely extended past
general. laudatory reviews of her books. and praise for her thoughtful poetry. Perhaps one
reason for this is that Zwicky is, in a specific sense, her own best critic; in her more
theoretically inclined works, Lyr ic Philosophy and Wisdom and Metaphor, Zwicky
performs the work of criticism upon herself, declaring her artistic intent and organizing
an extensive list of those thinkers who have influe nced her. using long quotations from
those writers to illustrate and illuminate her own ideas of poetry. It appears that Zwicky
has already performed the vital work of contextualization on her own oeuvre , thwarting
any potential critics with a seemingly. and dauntingly. complete reading list: in almost
random juxtaposition. Zwicky will have Kant hob-nob with D.H. Lawrence. Wittgenstein
speak with Borges. and Heidegger parley with Robert Bringhurst; the list continues
secmingly (/(I inf ini tum, although there are certain absences. To date. the major critical
works involving Jan Zwicky have been a collection of essays "inspired by" her poetry.
Ly ric t:cology. edited by Mark Dickinson and Claire Goulet, and Marjorie Pcrlofl's book
of criticism. lVillg en.l'lein ',\' I.adder. which contextualizes Zwicky in a broader cultural
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movement ofvWi ttgcnstcinian poetics.' Neither book grapples with Zw icky's thou ght.
the one ce lebrating it. the other merely referencing it in brie f the gener al absence o f
serious cri tica l wo rk on the poet sugg ests a gene ral relu ctanc e to engage Zwicky's
philo soph ica l poet ry on its own grou nds .
More than maybe any other poe t curre ntly work ing in Canada (w ith the possible
except ion of her friend and pee r, Tim Lilburn), Zw icky is a ph ilosopher poet , a writer
co ncerned wi th the very structure o f lan guage itsel f. Th e key influence that Zwicky
identifies in this rega rd is. of co urse . Ludw ig Witt gen stein , the subj ec t o fhe r Wittgenst ein
Elegies and a frequent co nversa tion partner in her Lyric Philosophy . Centra l to her
inter roga tions of langu age is the way that langua ge means, the way metaph or gri ps us. the
way that a poe m can ges ture tow ards an idea that it docs not art iculate so mu ch as
resonate wit h our expe rience s. Zwicky is not interested in merely inst rum ent al langu age .
Instead. she pursu es its holi sti c aspec t, which she terms the " Lyric": that whi ch possesses
an aesthetics of essentia l uni ty. For her, Witt genstein is a key exa mple o f th is " lyric "
phe nome non; much of her arg umen t in Lyric Philosophy stems from a defen ce of
Wittgcn stc in's Tructatus Logico-Philosophicus, his ea rly wor k tha t is genera lly ass umed
to be em blema tic ofthe kind o f "sys tematic" philoso phy he wo uld later rej ect. Zwicky's
base as sumption is tha t the Tractatus is in no way opposed to Wittge nstc in' later wor k,
but rat her an expre ssio n of the same ideas in a dif ferent form . The feature o f the
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7/ 'OC/O/IIS in whic h Zw icky identi fies its sa lvation is its structure. She wr ites "O ne
diff erence between the TruC/( I /II .\· and most exa mples of sys tematic ph ilosoph y is the bell -
like qu ali ty of the writing: eac h sentence see ms to exist as a full y self-suffic ient entity.
yet eac h seems a lso to se t the enti re struc ture resonating" (Lyric Philosophy. Sec tion 28).
Zw icky identiti es in the form of the Tractatus a co ns tructio n that she beli eves
recom me nds it above its peers in the ph ilosoph ical field , one where one need not
nece ssa ri ly read the treati se from start to fin ish to gras p its thou ght. Instead , she bel ieves
that one ca n isolate its eleme nts and still und erstand it, that the part will co mmunicate the
state of the who le. f or Zw icky, this qualit y is esse ntia l: "To gras p that it doesn 't matter
how one dra ws the fig ure is to see an as pec t; it is to grasp a ges talt" (Wisdom and
Metapho r 64) . This "re so nant structure" is precisel y what Zw icky define s as lyric,
making the 'l hIC/O/IIS more a poeti c wor k than simply a phi losop hica l one in her
esti ma tio n. I
Wittge nste in is the most celeb rated of those ph ilosoph ers with whom Zw icky
chooses to engage in her theoret ical work s, and provid es an exce llent base for
ap proac hing Zwicky's oe uvre; however. the cri tic must no te not s imply the avo wed
portio n of the wr iter 's influences but also those whi ch she avo ids. One o f the name s that
I Ac elebrated piece ofW iugensteinian trivia is that Wittgenstein considcredp rinting thc7 ;"lclallls ina
literary journal (Rozcl11a 357). Ccrtainly. thc" literary" quality of the T ractatus is something popularly
agreed upon, although the weight given this assertion may ditfcr from commenter to cornmcntcr.
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is conspicuously absent from Zwicky's list of conversation partners is Jacques Lacan, the
French psychoanalyst. Zwicky begins Lyri c Philosophy with a brief introduction on the
kernel that precipitated the book, Freud's account ofthc "primary processes" of thc
unconscious. She writes: "S ince the mid-1970s when 1 first read Freud, I've puzzled over
a question which I now believe to be one of the most fundamental arising out of the
rnetapsychology: why is what he there calls "primary process" timeless'?"(l l' ix). She
further suggests that "One entry into this book, then, is to see it as an attempt to answer
this question" (ix). In total, Zwicky approaches time and language as related concepts,
and asks how one can perceive "timelessness" through language. While Zwicky performs
an admirable feat in discerning the traces of an answer in philosophical and literary
traditions, she curiously shies away from the psychoanalytical tradition which helped her
articulate this question; it might be said that Jacques Lacan develops the same question
within this discipline. A disciple of Freud, Lacan renders psychoanalysis a structural
examination of language, fusing Freudian theory with Saussurean linguistics and Hegel's
dialectic, making Freud's discipline a noteworthy tool for examining, precisely, the root
ofv mcaning." For Lacan, "reality" is language, but its shapes and contours are in no way
linear or static structures. Rather, in its tumultuous cascade of changing forms, language
gestures towards the only truth: the place of the subject, which is essentially timeless.
Hence, "resonance" in language is a mirror, reflecting the truth of ourselves back to our
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own gaze. allowing us to glimpse ourselves briefly as we are as our image warps ,KroSS
the fun-house mirror of the world we know.
While the metaphor of the fun-house mirror is my own. I suspect that both
Zwicky and Lucan would appreciate it. although I am certain that they would recommend
certain additions and qualificat ions. I suspect this because they are essentially speaking
on the same subject, or perhaps more aptly, orbiting the same star; little wonder. then. that
they have never crossed paths. However. the fact remains that a potentially fruitful
dialogue between these two thinkers has never been opened; this thesis will attempt to
address this lack. [ will structure my argument along three interrelated lines: I) [ will
examine Zwicky's criticisms of contemporary philosophy. and suggest that if one includes
(at least Lacan's) post-modern linguistic theory in a definition ofr philosophy," then her
criticisms are not as damning as they initially seem; 2) I will compare Zwicky and
Lucan's philosophical systems in terms of their telos, and their more general feature s, in
order to identify the extent to which their philosophies coincide : 3) [ will usc Lacanian
theory to approach Zwicky's poetry. in order to demonstrate the psychoanalytical ground
for its "lyric" quality. My aim in performing this study is to draw attention to Zwicky's
work. both poetic and philosophical, and to provide a point ofac cess for discussion with
Lacanian theory. Consequently. parts of this essay will be essentially philosophic.
detailing differences in Zwicky and Lacan's lines of thought regarding epistemological
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(and spiritual) matters. and part literary. examining the body of Zwicky's work.
I feel compclied here to offer a qualification to this work. It may seem strange to
compare Zwicky and Lucan: Zwicky is a sensitive and serious thinker who attends to the
objects of her studies with gravity and respect, while Lucan can be something like a mad
clown. careening across subjects and. perhaps. over people's toes. There may be those
who are concerned that in applying Lacan to Zwicky's philosophy. I will do disservice to
her. either subsuming her ideas under a tautological theoretical framework. or "reducing"
her thought to something that may be undermined or dcconstructed according to the aims
of linguistic psychoanalytical theory. I do not see these possibilities as necessary
outcomes, and will endeavour to avoid them. However, I think Lacan represents. if not a
solution to Zwicky's criticisms of Western Philosophy. then at least an indication of its
still vibrant fecundity: Lacan shows there is a strand of Western thought that performs
much as Zwicky hopes it would. The fit is not perfect. nor could one expect it to be.
However. I hope the dialogue between these texts will offe r some indication of an escape
from the stagnancy of philosophy with which Zwicky is so concerned.
Carpc ntcr S
Chapter 2 On "Freud's Metapsychology and the Culture of Philosophy"
In 1999, Zwicky published an article in a supplement to The CanadianJournal 0/
Philosophy entitled "Freud's Metapsychology and the Culture of Philosophy." In this
essay, she restates many of the concerns of Lyric Philosophy , published in 1992: namely,
that philosophy as a topic of study has grown calcified and content with its structure of
investigation, and that attempts to make the whole of human experience cohere to logical
Iorm ultimately reduce them to a language that does not do that fabric ju stice. In this
essay, she clearly states what is implicit in Lyric Philosophy : "Phil osophy is also, or in
many quarters has also become, a job: an instituti onalized pract ice [.. .J it perm its an
assemb ly-line approach to problems, and it allows the ident itic ation of cr iteria of
philosophica l production" (224). This criterion is, of course, logical analysis, divorced
from the gesta/t of its conclusions by an emphasis on careful application of process,
adherence to form, and "o bjective" evaluation; consequently, the advancement of a
philosophical career depends on rote, mechanical investigation without genuine interest.
In other words, philosophy has become a self-replicating social machine rather than a real
inquiry into "truth," or, to use Zwicky's phrase, "t hinking in love with clarity" (223) .
In this article, Zwicky identifies the possibility of an alternative to this
institutionalized brand of philosophy in Freud's metapsychology, specifically citing his
essay "The Unconscious," and its focus on "the primary processes" of thought. or those
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that pertain to the Unconscious mind. Typically summarized by the complementary
pairing ofC ondensation and Displacement, the features of the unconscious that Freud
identifies that pique Zwicky's interest are less celebrated. She elaborates on those facets
that draw her attention: "an emphasis on psychical, rather than external, reality;
timelessness; a tolerance of paradox and contradiction; and the capacity to "exert on
somatic processes an influence of intense plastic power which the conscious act can
never do" ("Freud's Metapsychology," 215).2Of course, these features of the
unconscious mind contrast with "secondary processes," those associated with the
conscious mind. In Freud, these functions are rooted in the experience oftime, and the
principle of non-contradiction, which states that an object cannot bc itself and its opposite
simultaneously. Zwicky suggests that these processes are determined wholly by their
relation to grammatical and logical language, that their "meaning" relies on structures of
predicate and linear relation. The question Zwicky poses is: Why are only the products of
secondary process considered valid philosophical material? Or, more pointedly,
"Metaphilosophically, the paradox looks like this: If[ . .. J dreams have a /og o.l', primary
process does constitute a way or knowing - why has this not been of more interest to
philosophers?" (222). She suggests that both Freud, and the philosophers who toil in his
Ihe foreword to Zwicky's Lyric Philosophy even mentions that the "t imelessness" of primary process
is what firsta tlractcd her to Frclld's theories. and hclpcd inspire hcr thc idcas that woliide ventliallylca d
to the writing of that book.
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wake. make the mistake ofu nderestimating this second language, ofrequiring it to be
"translated' into conscious life if it is to be considered philosophically. and analytically.
valid.
The point that Zwicky hopes to make with this question is that it is an unjust
prejudice to suppose that the only features of thought that should be pursued, cultivated.
and lauded art: those that resemble logic. She asks in Lyric Philosophy. "What grounds
analysis as a metaphor for clarity more deeply than metaphors which emphasize depth of
understanding, depth of emotional resonance, exactness of analogy. precision of tone.
comprehensiveness, elegance, dignity?" (48). While her point is well taken. by
identifying Freud as the root of both the solution and the malady, she docs him a
disservice. Zwicky hinges her argument on his insistence that there can be "thought"
outside of the consciousness. that the unconscious can be understood as a separate mode
of thought. She identifies in this notion that ..the j imdamental distinction between what he
calls 'conscious' and ' unconsciousthought has nothing to do with awareness. but is. in
1:1t:1.structural" (21S). While her observation of the structural difference between the
conscious and the unconscious holds. 1must suggest an alternative reading of Freud's
theories that shows how limited Zwicky's represenation is: Lucan's "return to Freud..·
What Zwicky agrees with in her reading of Freud is that the unconscious. that is.
primary process, has a distinct logos from conscious thought. or secondary process: what
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she finds faulty in fre ud is the link between consciousness and awareness:
Where I diverge from Freud is precisely the point at which his account asserts the
in principle connection of one logos with awareness, and denies the possibility of
such a connection in the case of the other. The evidence that he amasses and
argues from points, without exception, to a purely circumstantial relationship: to
the existence of two distinct logoi operating in human mental activity ofwhich we
are, (/1 different times and vario usly , both conscious and unconscious. (2 18-9)
What Zwicky is guilty of here is a naively simple understanding of the nature of the
unconscious in Freud 's work: to understand the unconscious as a logos is to reduce it, and
to misunderstand its proper place in both Freudian and Lacanian schcmas, Zwicky herself
understands that primary process is not to be confused as a language itself, but attributes
that mistake to Freud:
[.. .J what the translation model as I' ve presented it fails to emphasize is a point
that the contrast with secondary process makes clear: primary process does not in
tact constitute a languag e. At least. not a language like first- or second-order
predicate calculus - its syntax is imagistic and freely associative, not linear and
fundamentally algebraic. And it is this, I think. that is at the root of our I~lilurt: ­
Freud's and philosophy's - to accept that primary process thought can be
meaningful in the absence of secondary process reconstruction: it is a version of
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the claim that a ll me anin g worth y o ft he name is in a narrow sense lingui st ic.
(222-3)
T he qu esti on I as k Zw icky is : What in Freud sugge sts that thi s ass oc iative thou ght is its
own lan gu age, and not an ess entia l feature of spoken lan guage itself ? While Zwicky's
c laim appea rs to be entirely valid fo r most contemporary philo soph y, it doe s essent iall y
mi ss Fre ud's s ignific ance ; at least , as elab orated and reve al ed by Lucan.
To suggest that Freud di smi sses the primary processes of the unconsci ou s insofar
as the y do not conform to the struc ture o fp red icated language is a mistake , and it is in
Luca n' s readin gs of Freud that thi s is mad e mo st cl ear. Zw icky 's reading of "T he
Unco nsc ious" is not an unc ommon one, where it is suppos ed that Freud po sit s the
uncon sci ou s as an entit y unt o itself : a thing to be approached waril y from the po siti on o f
the ego; ce rta inly, the ch aracterization o f the " id" or " it," the loath some disavowed
porti on of o ur psych e, lend s credence to that reading. However, the unc on sciou s is not the
id, and the relati on ship o f the uncon sciou s to the con scious mind is more complex, and
mo re o rga nica lly entwined, than th is interpretation all ow s.
Ind eed, it is in Lucan 's reinterpret ati on o f Freud 's the orie s that we see this readin g
deflected, as he tran sform s the Freudi an text into some thing mu ch de ep er than a
superfic ia l read ing a llo ws . It is true that in the essay, "The Unconsc ious: ' Freud sugges ts
tha t primary proc ess mu st be percei ved throu gh the con sci ou s mind if it is to be
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experienced consciously .' and that psychoanalysis is the tool that allows this exchange:
however, in Lacans reading of Freud, the unconscious completely prefigures the realm of
consciousness, such that any subjective experience carries with it the experience of the
unconscious.~ In the Psychopathology ofEveryday Life. Freud demonstrates the
parapraxis, or the famous " Freudian slip; it is his hypothesis that it is only when speech
ceases to function, when the instrumental use of language is exceeded in the psyche
through association and the twin processes of condensation and displacement, that one
can glimpse workings of the unconscious:
Among the examples of the mistakes [, .jcollected by me [ can scarcely lind one
[...JI would be obliged to attribute the speech disturbance simply and solely to
what Wundt calls "contact effect of sound," Almost invariably I discover besides
this a disturbing infl uence something outside of the intended speech. The
disturbing de ment is either a single unconscious thought. which comes to light
through the special blunder, and can only be brought to consciousness through a
searching analysis, or it is a general psychic motive, which directs against the
In lI' i ll gCI1SICillI?cadl' Fr cud. Jacques Bouvcressc suggests that Frclld's colllparisonofthc prcscnccof
thclin consciolis inthc consciollslll indpa rallcist hc cxpcriencco ft hc world as sense data would havc
been criticized by Wiugenstcin ovcrthcconfllscdlllodcloflllcnta lcvc ntsc ithcrbe ingperceivcd, ornot
being perceived with thcp ossibilityofbeing so( 24). Zwicky'scritic islllscoli ldbe lindcrstoodasan
extension of those here attriblited to her prilllary intlllcncc.
I Zwicky identi fi es rhis relutionship in the vontogenet icv relationship Freud attempts to form in his
abor!cd essay, "l'rojcctforaSc icntiticl'sychology"("F rclld's Mctapsychology, 2 15),bllt, l think,d ocs
notr ecognizct hccon seqllcntpolVcrof thclincon sciollsovcrt hccon sciolis tot hc salllcd egreethat
l.acan does.
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entire speech5 (80)
One should note that because of the presence of this "general psychic motive," which
"directs aga inst the entire speech," the slip is in no wayan isolated eve nt; it can be rather
regarded as a glimpse to a much larger underlying structure which does not compete with
the conscious mind but, rather, creates it. Already, Freud identities the unconscious as a
structural necessity. the basis for the conscious mind.
l.aca n would later expand on this centra l concept of Freudian psychology. making
it the norm rather than the excep tion. He would also suggest that the unconscious can be
forensica lly traced only by obse rving a person's speech in a holistic fashion, that the
unconscious not only exhibits its controlling force in slips (although it docs so most
tellingly), but in the sum total ofa person's speech. In The Four Fundamenta l Concepts
ofPsychoa nulysis, Lacan states that "The unconscious is the sum ofthe effects of speech
on a subject. at the level at which the subject constitutes himself out of the effect s of
signifier" (126). The infl uence of the unconscious on the conscious mind, then. is total,
intrinsic. and only discerned in the body of utterance put forth by the subject. In fact, the
unconscious could be understood as a symptom of the conscious. and vice versa.
integrally related and co-dependent: two sides of the same coin, or aspects of an identical
ob ject (the psyche) . Lucan recognizes in Freud's writing that the godfather of
Amllsinglye nollgh,t heo riginal text that is qlloted here hasse veral typological errors (two grammatical
intrllsive liseso f the lVord" in")t hat l havee ditedo lit here.
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psychoanalysis did not sec the conscious and unconscious as distinct and separate
objects. but as absolutely. organically entwined features of the same being. Zwicky's key
criticism of contemporary Western philosophy is indeed insightful and potentially
damning. but insofar as it relates to the original theorizing of the nature of the
unconscious and its relationship with the conscious mind. it is something of a misstep.
Indeed. it seems that Zwicky's reading of Freud has been influenced by the very school of
thought that she means to criticize, reflecti ng and implying its values against the very
source of the solution she proposes; to read Freud as putting forth two essential/ogoi is to
misinterpret him in the wake ofa century of philosophy that suggests that the
unconscious mind needs to be made conscious to be seen; Freud was much more
interested in the way that the unconscious mind manifests itself in the day to day than
Zwicky's reading would suggest.
2. 1 Witt gcn stcin, Language, and Psychoanalysis
Zwicky's criticism of Freud is somewhat broad and vague, largely used as a
stepping stone towards making a more comprehensive critique of modern philosophy;
however. her treatment of Freud can be contextualizcd and accounted for, if read as
influenced by her "mentor" on linguistic matters, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Zwicky avows
Wingenstcin as both a powerful influence and a muse, the genesis of much of her thought
on the subject of language and poetry's role within it. Jacques Bouveresse, in
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lI'illgcns/cin Reads Freud: The Myth ofthe Unconscious , offers an insightful reading into
the problems that Wiugcnstein had with the famous analyst, who was a prominent and
influentia l figure in the Vienna ofWittgc nstcin's youth. One ofWi ttgenstcin's main
criticisms of Freud was that he was forced to resort to the "grammar" of conscious states
to describe unconscious processes, whose "mechanism obeys laws that are in principle
completely different" (Bouveresse, 25). We see in this criticism similarities to Zwicky's
suggestion that the "translation" of unconscious material into conscious material is
unnecessary, and, perhaps, ill-advised.
This criticism regarding the "translation" of the unconscious results from a
somewhat unclear, sloppy metaphor in Freud's article: communication. By using the term
"communication" in "The Unconscious" to describe the effect of the unconscious on the
conscious, he obscures the particular way that this transmission occurs by implying two
equal and discrete entities; the error is compounded by the metaphor of "content" in
describing that which composes the unconscious, as if the unconscious sends parcels to
its counterpa rt. These words direct the reader's attention away from the more important
point regarding the form of the unconscious, "cathexis" : he writcs r[ i]n the
[unconscious], there are only contents, cathcctcd with greater or lesser strength" ( 186).
While it appears here that "there are only contents," a reader more versed in
psychoanalytical tradition will emphasize the cathexis he/ween those "contents" as the
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unconscious. Cathexis is the investment of libidinal energy into an idea. the way that an
idea will be invested with more primal energies and associations (which. in the Freudian
tradition. arc arranged in terms of the Oedipal triangle). To usc a rather loose analogy. in
the Freudian matrix the conscious is to the unconscious as matter is to energy for
Einstein: an animating force that may ultimately be the same thing. Consequently, the
unconscious can only be scm by conscious subjects by way of its affect on conscious
"content." One could find a clear example ofthe cathectic qualities of the unconscious by
imagining a young man who falls in love with a woman who wears the same perfume that
his deceased mother once did; the effect of the unconscious is not the "tran slation" of the
memory of the smell. but rather the way that the young man has arranged his desires as a
result of this associa tion. So. while Freud describes the connection of the unconscious
mind to the conscious one in terms of "communication: ' thus enabling criticisms of
"translatio n' of two distinct structures, he also characterizes that communication as the
electrical dispersal of energies from one structure to the other, and we may take this term
as the bcttcr. jnorc clcarand distinctmetaphor,
Lucan's famous epigram, ..the unconscious is structured like a language" (FFC
20). delily removes psychoanalysis from the dangers Wittgcnstcin and Zwicky foresee for
it. identifying the unconscious as having a certain "internal logic" that resembles
language. but which could not, should not, be mistaken for logos. In Lacan, logos refers
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to the subject's emergence into language which constitutes the subject as lack: it is, in this
sense, monolithic and singular. While these "languages," may be plural, in the sense of
existing in many forms, this is not to say that the unconscious must be "translated" in
analysis: rather the conscious must be mapped ji'ol/l its roots in the unconscious the
relationship being essential, productive, and singular.
Lacan's innovations on Freud's theories offer a further safeguard against Zwicky's
criticism of psychoanalysis: in addition to rejecting the idea of the unconscious as a
separate logos, the Lacanian reading of Freud sidesteps Zwicky' s accusations by placing
"meaning" not under the auspices of linguistics, but rather in the "slips" and fractures that
display the power of the primary processes: furthermore, Lacan identifies in Freud the
conceptual hierarchy that allows one to identify the causal trace of the primary processes
in the secondary. For Lacan, "rational" thought (the kind of predicative language Zwicky
refuses to grant total epistemological status) only gains its communicative power and
force, its meaning . by way of the unconscious. The same is true for poetic, or lyric,
writing." Ultimately, this model inverts the structure Zwicky identifies and criticizes in
Freud's theories, by granting the unconscious and its primary processes the privileged
position in its relationship to language. In other words, the psychoanalyst is able to trace
Whilc oopocticOO and oorat ionaloowriting are similarlyanc horedi n unconsciousprocc sscs,w e can observe
Ihati np octry structurcs similar to thoseF reudi dentities in the unconscious (namely condcnsationa nd
displacement). The case could also be made that the philosophical processes ofa nalysis, induction, and
synthesis operate under similar principles, but that argument is best made elsewhere.
Carpenter 19
the pull of the primary processes on conscious language because the unconscious follows
the same essential "geogra phy," sharing the same border as the conscious mind (the edge
of the coin is shared by the two sides, after all). Moreover, thcunconsciousi s
conceptualized as thc reason those borders exist, such that any close study of the
conscious will yield insight into the structures that gave rise to it (not unlike discerning
skeletal structure from the contours of the body).
While it would not be quite accurate to state simply that Wittgenstein's criticisms
or Freud arc also Zwicky's, there is little doubt that her discourse is heavily influenced by
his work; addressing the way Lacan's innovations address Wittgenstein's criticisms will
help to provide a staging grounds for critical discussion. To that end, I will now approach
a second, more troubling criticism Wittgenstein laid on Freud. as outlined by Jacques
Hou veresse:
What psychoanalysis discovered is certainly not the fact that reasons can be
hidden from the person who has them, since we commonly explain somconc 's
actions with reasons of this kind. By refin ing a technique that allows us to induce
the subjects to recognize as theirs various motives that were hitherto
unacknowledged and which they would never have accepted at the outset. we arc
simply provided with new criteria or new reasons which allow us to say that
someones behaviour was determined in a way that the subject was unaware of:
Carpcntcr Zr)
bymotivl:st hat were notconscious [.. [ This is the problem Wittgenstein raises: in
what sense does the patient's recognition that she "now sees" the true reaso n for
her behavior constitute proof that she has discovered, by methods used in such
cases, that it was present and opera tive during the entire period in question'?(30-
1)
The "historica l" nature of Freud's theories does indeed imply that it is necessary that the
process of analysis unearth and reconstruct hidden truths with in the psyche;7 The
question of the influe nce of the analyst then becomes cruc ial, as it is possible that the
analysand "receives" a poorly reconstructed, or downright imposed, version of their
unconscious motivat ions, thereby implying the more sinister possibilit ies of "translation"
that so troub le Zwicky in Freud's discourse. l.acan sidesteps this particular problem by
suggesting that the history of the realization is meaningless, and that its truth-value is
determined only by its recognition in the analysand; indeed, Lacan holds the "technique
that allows us to induce the subjects to recognize as theirs various motives that were
hitherto unacknowledged and which they would never have accepted at the outset" as the
very purpose of analysis, its essential, recommending feature. This process, that of
anamnesis, is one to which this essay will return. However, for the moment, suffice to say
James Mellard suggests in " Inventing Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Linguistics and Tropology in The
Agency ofthe Letter," that Freud used the tropes of archcological investigation in constructing his
psychoanalysis. while Lucan used the tropes of lingIIisties to redefine Freud's theories.
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that be cau se w hat is at stake is not a " true" histo ry. but rathe r the psyc ho logical well
bei ng o f the subject in the mome nt. the ana lys t is no t sim ply "g iving" a fa lse hi sto ry.
Becau se histo ry ex ists only insofar as it is recog nized by the ana lysand, the tru th of an
ana lys t's recon stru cti on is measu red not in its rel ati on to an object ive history. but rat her in
how effectively it impa rts se lf awa reness to the suffering neurotic . Person al history is not
me re ly "g ive n: ' but rathe r " recognized: ' and. in that sense. subj ec tively tru e.
2.2 Fear and Loathin g: Post-mod ernism and Analys is
One co uld certa inly wonder wh y or ho w Zwicky did not invest igate, o r ev en admit the
ex istence of, the Lacani an traditi on o f ana lysis in critic iz ing Fre ud . T he apparent an sw er
is a di str us t and suspic ion o f those trend s in co nte m pora ry thou ght ca lled
"p oststructura lism, " und er whi ch Lacan is typic all y catego rized and w hic h Zwic ky
iden titie s in its genes is in Freud :
T he demand for interpretat ion is thu s a gesture of de lcgiti miza t ion: and the ero s of
inter preta tio n is not s imply the exercise o f pow er. but the locat ion of meanin g in a
struc ture that crea tes the idea of pow er as ' rank in a hierarch y.' T he aca de mi c
apo theos is o f th is tre nd is not . as might be ima gined . so -ca lled ' ana lytic '
ph iloso phy - which at least suspects the existe nce of ren egade me ntal ac tivity
aga ins t w hic h it mu st be vigilant. It is. rather, postst ructura lism - the blithe
nihilismofiln)'u{J(lS c!e !lvl'.I'-leXle - that mos t pro llll llld ly exe mplilies the
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exclusion of non-linguistic thought from consideration, and is thus most clearly
symptomatic of contemporary intellectual malaise. ( n S)
Lucan's theories escape the "blithe nihilism" of Derrida's maxim by showing that the text
is always more than itsel f; for Lucan. the very lack of an hors-textc is the site of
possibility, a rich fabric of non-sense which determines, in a curiously Cartesian way,
truth, the only possible truth; the role of the subject in determining the meaning of a text.
In other words, there is indeed an outside of text, but it should not be mistaken for a text.
Rather, it is the subject itself:
every thing can be said be said of truth, of the only truth - namely, that there is no
such thing as a metalanguage (an assertion made so as to situate all of logical
positivism), no language being able to say the truth about truth, since truth is
grounded in the fact that truth speaks, and that it has no other means by which to
become grounded. ("Science and Truth: ' 737)
The "hors-texte' is only "translated" (traced, discerned, archeologically and critically
reconstructed) when one has a need of translation, when the unconscious root of our
behaviour a ff ec ts us in troubling ways that hinder our aims and happiness (one should
remember that both Lacan and Freud were practicing psychoanalysts whose careers were
not built on merely empty theory, but on the practical grounds of aiding those with
psychological problems).
Carpen ter 23
In fact , what Lacan identifies in Freud 's formulation o f the uncon sci ou s is the
preci se opposite o f what Zwicky sees : the underside o f logos rather tha n a compet ing
structure; the lim inal space betwe en the ' whereo f' s and ' thereo f' s o f speec h and silence,
and the roo t of all meanin g. It is thi s space that Lacan describes in the following passage
from The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis:
I am try ing to make you see by approximation that the Freudi an uncons ciou s is
situa ted at that point , wh ere, between cau se and that wh ich it affect s, there is
always something wrong [.. . ] For what the unconscious doe s is to show us the
ga p throu gh which neuro sis recre ates a harmony with a real - a real that may not
be determined. (22)
This " real" that " may not be det ermined" is a cornerstone of Lacan's thought , one of the
centra l aspects to his ontology that can be recog nized as a true innov ati on on Freud' s
model o f the psych e. The " Real" (oft en capita lized in Lacanian studies) repre sent s the
unknow abl e. in the way it present s itsel f to us: that aspect o f ou r experience which
co nfronts and disrupt s our comfortable expe ctations. ln other word s, it is the gl impse of
the hors-texte, the mom ent that suggests that perhap s there is something essenti al and
ungra spablc beyo nd our experienc e, which can only be experienced in the very
insufficnc y o f that ex perience . It is a lso , [ think . co nce ptually s imilar to the "un-
interpreted" form Zwicky believ es the lyric quality of dream s and poetr y achieve .
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Zwicky asks philosophical practice to be aware of language' s richness agains t
strict signification, to appreciate poetic/lyrical meaning in its aims and to avoid
"dclegitimizing" the ges talt realm of language. In doing so. however, Zwicky appears to
have missed the directio n psychoanalytical analysis has taken after f reud. in Lucan's
wake. and consequently the more inclusive understanding of " language" as a structure
that necessitates its own, unspoken liminal moors that has become implicit in much
contempora ry theory." Zwicky's criticisms of contemporary thought may hold in
application to specific schools of thought, but is somewhat ineffective in the face ofthe
linguistic post-Freudian theory of analysis put forth by Lacan and developed by those
who followed him. While this assertion does nothing to mitigate Zwicky's criticisms of
contemporary, conservatively-defined "philosophy," Lacan's inquiries into language
suggest that in the broader context of Western thought, the issues that Zwicky prescribes
examination for are indeed being approached from at least one theoretical perspective.
The key similarity betwee n Zwicky's poetics and Lacan's psychoanalysis is that they are
concerned with the space beneath language, recognizing the unconscious not as a
competing structure but as an integral one, the birthplace of meaning, and that simply
because one cannot speak in strictly logical terms on the subject docs not mean that one
< Perhaps one could identity symptoms of the strange shin that has occurred in the 20'10 century from
"philosophy" ass uch to" thcory," a gcncral migration from the austcre eff ort of determining vtruth" to
the more finite, positionally directed. and playful attempt to understand specific problems in specific
co ntex ts.
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cannot speak on the subj ect whatsoeve r. Whi le Wit tgcnstcin may have into ned that what
we cannot speak abo ut we must pass over in silence, what Zw icky and Lacan note is that
that s ilence ca n be sonorous : it merely depe nds on how one listen s.
Chapter 3 Alienation and "The Emotional Tone of Wisdom"
Whilc Zwicky appea rs to have worke d in parall el to Luca n. never direc tly
encountering his wo rk, distinct s imilarities arise when one com pares so me of the major
po ints of each philo sop hica l approac h. So me min or exeges is is needed to make this point ,
which I wi ll supply here. I wish to argue, howeve r, that altho ugh Zwicky an d Laca n use
the term "metap ho r" in very diff erent ways, refer ring to a specifi c conv ent ion of poe tic
composition and as a feature ofa neur ot ic's speec h, respecti vely, the jilll cl io/l of metaphor
within language remains almost co mpletely the sa me : a way to d isrupt " time" and
(perso nal) histo ry in such a way to achieve what may be ca lled an " integrated" speec h.
3. 1 On Metaphor: Zwicky
Jan Zwicky's second major philosophical wor k, Wisdom & Metaphor . sugge sts
that the two terms in its title are intrinsica lly related . that meta phor is require d lo r
wisdom and vice versa. Zwicky sugges ts tha t metaph or is a po tent way ofvsccing as." of
apprehending something " true." The se concep ts are very broa d. and they require speci fic
de fi nition; Z wicky of co urse eluc idates her mea nings. a ltho ugh she is co ntent to let the
broa d array of associations they co nju re do some ofthc talking for hcr. Nevertheless , she
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suggests that "see ing-as" is "the result of the natural attuncment of our capacities for
perception to the world" (WM L26). a perceptual organization that resembles "lyric" in
the sense that it depends on an internal cohesion. or resonance. for its meaning; for
Zwicky. "seeing as" is something like an aesthetic enterprise. an organizational quality
that suggests wholeness. The key to seeing-as. to attributing wholeness to the world. is
not to expect a final state. but to involve oneself in the process of understanding:
To understand is to see how things hang together. Even in cases that involve
analysis, understa nding is not knowing that if you follow a series of steps, you
will get a certain result, but seeing how the result is contained in that series of
steps. (A mathematical proof , a mechanical assemblage.) (WM 124)
The key to seeing-as. then. is to be open to the change; understanding. in Zwicky's
estimation. has little to do with static representations of the world. and more to do with an
engagement with the structures that govern it. as re fle c ted in systematic representations
of that reality. For her. the "truth" of a metaphor is how it pulls the mind towards the
process of understanding. rather than presenting a simple fact. or object of knowledge: it
is a glimpse of the "mechanical assemblage" ofl anguage that allows one to escape being
caught in its gears. "The implied 'is not' in a metaphor points to a gap in language through
which we observe the world. That which we glimpse is what the 'is' in a metaphor points
to"lWM LI0). For her. metaphor is a rupture in the normal llaw of language. where a
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word does not simply correspond to a single object. but also to its opposite. To use
Zwicky's own example. to say that "the heart is a sad machine" is also to draw attention
to the "non-machincncss" of the heart. to say something that escapes the typical flow of
instrumental language: metaphor is necessarily a comment on the way that we "mean"
something that we say. the way that we understand, in this case, the heart, its operation.
and a host of cultu ral connotations about what the heart represents.
The key to this "truth" of metaphor. in Zwicky's estimation, is that it overrides
what she calls "calcifi ed language"; this action is analogous to a mechanic's appraisal of
the linguistic machine , the greasing of the gears, allowing language to continue to
function. Metaphor. then, is a process of understandin g. a way to bring one inexorably
closer to Wisdom in that it promotes attentiveness, and disrupts assurn ption.
To say that all understanding has the character of seeing-as is not to say that all
language is metaphorical. Thinking that aims at understandin g is. in fact. always a
form of resistance to linguistic orthodoxy. Not merely to some part icular
linguistic orthodoxy (though it may be that. too), but to the orthodoxy that is. of
all humans, the inevitable perceptual-epistemic consequence of learning to refer.
(WM IA6)
Zwicky speaks of "dead" language, of speech that relies on structures for its own
meaning. Her point is simple: that consistent. tool-like use of language numbs us to its
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existence, making it boring and static. draining it of resonance and so of meaning,
rendering it beneath contemplation. Once one can ignore language. then one can easily
make the mistake that it is entirely co-existent with reality: one mistakes the word for the
thing. For Zwicky. metaphor is ultimately the antidote to the predicament of existing in
language. as it introduces possibility, room to move, in the stranglehold that language has
on the individual's imagination.
3.2 On Metaphor: Lac:1I1
For Lucan, the psyche is as much created by language as it produces it itself. and
so features such as "metaphor" have a crucial part to play in the experience. and
development, of the subject. Just as Freud used the "Oedipal triangle" to describe the
essential moment in the development of the neurotic, so too docs Lacan, but he
introduces a radically linguistic clement to this classical psychoanalytical concept.
Freud's assertion was that male children desire their mothers sexually, a desire that they
quickly learn is forbidden by the figure of the father who instead claims that right by dint
of his relative strength and authority. Lacan reifies this model into a structural account of
the emergence into language, where language is an intrusion between the happiness of
union with the mother (the womb. the suckled breast. the full and undivided attention
towards the fulfiIIrn cnt of the child's needs). Indeed. the term Lucan uses for this, "lc nom
du perc" or "name of the father: ' plays on an element of homophony in the original
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French. where the word 1/011/ sounds similar to "1/01/" or "no.' Thus. the fathe r represents
not jus t a bar to sexual desire. but to the self as undifferent iated from the Other.4 From
this starting point. Oedipal desire becomes a metaphor for the return to the pre-linguistic.
transfiguring Freud's sexually libidinous theory into a linguistic one. The formative
moment ofa child's deve lopment is its insertion into an order. where it is differentiated
from its mother, and from its father again . This initial division is the start ofal l the rest.
and is the fi rst expe rience of what l.acan calls "alienation," the essential feeling of
division and dissatisfac tion expe rienced by the neurotic.
In this psychoanalytical schema. language is a "sign ifying chain : ' where every
part implies the presence of the rest: one part of the codified syntax of language implies
every other part. When a subject comes to experience itsel fa s an 'I.' it is as part ofa chain
of signitiers: me. mommy. daddy, food. etc. This process of differenti ation becomes
infinite. implying a vast code of items stretching beyond one's individual experience. The
problem is that there is noth ing intrinsically distinct between different utterances: at this
level. speech only communicates a relationship to the whole of language. which
manifests as a ceaseless babbling because of what Lucan describes as "metonymic
slippage.' Samuel Weber explains the basic premise of this distinc tion in The Return to
Freud: "The effec t of mean ing (that is. ofa determinate signified) presupposes the
.J Note that in this case, the Oedipal triad is equallyt rue for both male and female children.
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functioning 0 1''1 signifier in a chain" (67) . Because every signifier is associated with
every other at an elemen tary level. speech necessarily slides through the forms of
language from part to part in a kind of circuit. Sadly, the product of this slippage is what
Lucan calls "empty speech," utterances in line with the "rule s" of language , the code
implied by the signify ing chain that do not contr ibute to the field ofmeaning. In adult
life, any utteranc e that is fashioned and directed towards the other that the subject 10
expects (the "big other" that is ultimately the personal notion of what is demanded from
the subject by language) is essentially empty, a product of neurosis where the subject
simply "o beys the rules," without affect or import. Metaphor, on the other hand,
represents a kind of a "speed bump" to this racing "meaning:' a subversion of
signification that disrupts the slippage from one signifier to the next and allows an
utterance to genuinely communicate:
Metaphor 's creat ive spark docs not spring forth from the juxtaposition of two
images, that is, of two equally actualized signifiers . It flashes between two
signifiers. one of which has replaced the other by taking the other's place in the
signifying chain, the occulted signifier rema ining present by virtue of its
(metonymic) connection to the rest of the chain. (vlnstance of the Letter," 422)
111 Thc vSubjcc t't and rO thcr" in this case arc. orc ourse, the analysand and the analyst. as l.acan couches
his discourse specifically in psychoanalytical application. lIowcvcr. thcrc is littlc problcl11 in rcauing
thcscco nccpts l11oreb roadly, "o tTtheco llch,"asil were.
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Rather than rnetonymically slipping from one signifier to another, metaphor cements one
to another, providing a point of' vmeaning" understood as "symptom": the position of the
subject within the field of language. In this conception. we can set: distinct similarities
between Lacan's idea of metaphor and Zwicky's definition of it as a gestalt shiIi between
"is" and "is-not": both authors present the metaphor as a duality, a set containing binary
opposites. This comparison is further highlighted by Weber's description of Lucan. who
declares succinctly that "[w]e see that metaphor is situated at the precise point at which
meaning is produced in nonrneaning" (423).
The "meaning" that comes from nonrncanin g is psychoanalytically rich, a product
of what Lucan calls "full" speech. Full speech, which is opposed to empty speech, is that
which communicates the unconscious desire of the subject, where the subject escapes
from the intensely codified chain ofs ignifier s and, unbeknownst to him/herself
communicates something truly personal. In the psychoanalytical relationship, the analyst
is on guard for the analysand to slip into metaphor, because that is when the analysand
betrays the hidden truth of his/her unconscious desires. In a sense, it is the truth of his/her
personal language: the way that that inherited, cultural material has been appropriated
and adapted to the subject and his/her unconscious. Lacan elaborates this concept in
"The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious":
Metapho r's two-stage mechanism is the very mechanism by which symptoms, in
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the analytic sense, are determined. Between the enigmatic signifier of sexual
trauma and the term it comes to replace in a current signifying chain. a spark fl ies
that fixes in a symptom - a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a
signilying subject. by which the symptom may be dissolved. (431)
The metaphor is the indicator of the symptom fllI r excellence. indicative of the short
circuits that a psyche accumulates against the limits of its personal language. a "synonym
lor the symbolic displacement brought into play by the symptom" (Function. 2 16). That
is to say, metaphor illustrates the difference between the discourse of the conscious and
the discourse of the unconscious. showing how the unconscious structures the conscious
and tracing the liminal border of where the two structures meet. In other words,
metaphor indicates the place of the unconscious in the conscious utterance in much the
same way that the classic freudian slip docs: it is a site of fecund interpretation. where
the inner workings of the mind reveal themselves. Moreover, l.acan situates the metaphor
in a more social context than the strictly analytical relationship shared between analyst
and analysand: he writes in "On a Purpose" that " Freud' s discovery shows the structural
reason why the literality of any text. whether proposed as sacred or pro fane, increases in
importance the morc it involves a genuine con fron tation with truth" (305). If we
recognize that Lacan specifically situates ..truth" in the context ofv full speech.' then it
becomes clear that any text. not j ust the one presented to the analyst. can speak "fully."
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including, of course, a poem.
It is clear that when Zwicky writes of "dead language," she means precisely the
same thing l.acan does when he speaks of "empty speech": a slavish devotion to code and
expectation that belies any real "meaning." For Zwicky, philosophical analysis is a
product of rationality to the exclusion of all else which falls into this category of dead
language, as she sees linear logic as offering too rigid a model of what can and cannot be
said. In Lacan's estimation, any utterance which does not reveal the unconscious is
essentially "empty," and the analyst will seek to induce more revealing statements from
the patient. Of course, from the analyst's perspective, full speech will necessarily occur
eventually; the patient cannot help but slip. From the poet's perspective, however, "full"
speech only occurs when one has achieved something from within her craft; the
difference (perhaps the only difference) is a matter of application: the analyst is trained to
recognize the root of the symptom in the patient, while the poet must recognize fertile
ground within her own imagination. In both cases, attention must be paid to the site of
meaning, and recognized as such, albeit for ostensibly different purposes. However, the
essent ial similarity in defini tions o fm etaphor becomes even more clear when their
relationship to time, and timelessness, is compared.
3,3 Timc ill Lyric Form
Zwicky writes in Wisdom & Metaphor that the "logic" of metaphor is defined by
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loss: "To understand a metaphor is always to experience loss at the same time as
conncxion. This is the mark of ontological comprehension in a being with language"
(L56). From this assertion. she draws the conclusion that " Loss-in-conncxion, counexion-
in-loss is the emotional tone of wisdom" (L56). I would suggest that these are the words
of a poet more than a philosopher. insofar as we are dealing with the calcified definitions
ofw hat each entails: it is an intuitive understanding that is largely gestural in nature. The
details of the suggestion, as well as its rhetorical force. arc based in the broad possibility
of associative thought. and do not conform to logical structure. Certainly, one could
suppose that Zwicky is speaking here of several, simultaneous defin itions of wisdom: the
paradoxical experience of infinity in the temporally confined lite of the subject suggests
itself: as docs the curiously conflic ted nature of identity, where one can only be a member
of the whole as an individual part: also suggested is the world-weary words of one who
has seen the worst life can offer. The associative power of a statement like this, which is
at once authoritative and opaque, is a strong example of the kind of insight Zwicky
suggests that poetry can foster over strictly analytic rigour, Part of its strength is derived
from its invisible rootedness: one "understands" this suggestion only if one has the
personal experiences that can ground it only if one has a way to recognize the pre-
linguistic epiphany to which it alludes. The statement docs not provide its own context
instead requiring the participation of the reader, and it is in this median activity that it
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derives its "truth: ' such that one may ask: is it possible to und erstand this statement
unalytica lly, layin g it bare for uni versal examina tion. with out rende rin g its message inert ?
The Lacani an answer is a confl icted one : ges tura l procl ama tion s exis t more in the
aud ience than in the utte rance. and one mu st have a structure on which to hang what one
hears to be ab le to und erstand it: that structure will be both cul tural (o r " unive rsa l") and
perso na l. I 1 It is this peculi arl y ill defined relationship that Lacan ges tures tow ard s when
he speaks ofthe "ext irnacy" o f the unc onscious. the trace o ft he oth er one ex periences in
one' s inner mos t bein g : he writes in Se minar VII that the Oth er is "so mething strange to
me. a lthough it is at the heart of me" (7 1). This ex perience ofextimacy, which very well
cou ld be s tated as " loss - in-co nnex ion connexion-in-loss," is roo ted at the most
funda me nta l level at wh ich the subject is fo rmed . and it provides not o nly a struc ture
from wh ich to understand Zwicky's declaration , but also a ju stifi cati on for the essentiall y
s ingular and personal ex perience of its truth . Of cour se, s ince the paradoxi cal nature
envi sion ed by Freud as inherent in the pr imary processes helped ins pire Zwicky to
address the phi loso phy of language by way of poetr y. it stands to reason that within the
psychoanalytical trad ition there wo uld be a deve loped system of analy tica l thought
concerned wit h the esse ntial paradox of "connex ion- in-loss ." I bel ieve that the thread of
thought Zwicky foll ows in this instance leads to Lacans co nce ption o f the mirror stage.
" The ambiva lence oft he French terlll "entendre,"· whiehh overs between "toh ear" and "to understand,"'
lends itself to a conception of listening that parallels the ditference bctwccn empty and full speech.
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the divided self, and the "h istorical" process of identity form ation,
For Lacan, the subject must be based on a certain formative lack: to be is to
always lose oneselfa nd become oneself simultaneously, His idea of the mirror stage,
which was his earliest contribution to the larger field of psychoanalytical thco ry, l ~ details
how the subject comes into being only through a certain fundamenta l alienation from
itself. This phase can be briefly sketched as follows: a child looks at him/herselfi n the
mirror, and by recognizing the reflec tion of his/her still clumsy motor movements in that
image, the child sees him/herselff or the first time, both asa subject and as other. From
thenceforth, this duali ty of recognition is always present in the self, and is considered part
oft he child's entry into language: the child sees itselfa s the ' I: but in seeing itselfmu st
always identify the ' T as something estranged from itself, Samuel Weber succinctly
outlines the paradox: "The ego is thus initially constituted through the child's
ident ification with an image whose otherness is precisely overlooked in the observation
of similarity, Despite the effort to ignore it, however, such altcrity can never be entirely
effaced, since it is what permits the identification to take place' (13).
This observation relates directly to the conscious experience of time, or "history: '
itself L ll:an l:xplores the l:ausal link between the alienated selfa nd the experienceof
" The mirrorst age was fi rst suggested in a 1936 essay. but Lacan expanded and revised the concept
extensively in the fol lowing decades. The essay available in Ecrits. "The Mirror Stage as Formative of
the z Functionus Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experieucc.v is based on 1949 lecture.
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time in "The Mirror Stage as Formative oft he I Function":
Ihi s development is experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects
the individual's formation into history: the mirror stage is a drama whose internal
pressure pushes precipitously (rom insuffic iency to anticipation - and for the
subject to get caught up in the lure of spatial identification, turns out fantasies that
proceed from a fragmented image of the body to what I will call an "orthopedic"
form of its totality - and to the tinally donned armor of an alienating identity that
will mark his entire mental development with its rigid structure. (78)
The emerge nce into "history" is a kind of coping device fundamental to the working of
the psyche: a way of unifying the imag« oft he self with the experience of the self that
will never entirely efface the difference, The totality is "orthopedic" in the sense that it is
corrective and inserted. in much the same way that an insert in a shoe makes up for a
deficie ncy in one's foot or gait. And, although it is ultimately a liberating structure, the
basis lor a subject to interact with the outside world. it is experienced as a loss, an
imposition: the very definition of a "connexion-in-loss."
The actual form of this insertion ofe xisting "in history" is a linguistic one.
lndccd, Lucan formulates his conception ofpersonal identity as absolutely exemplified in
the French verb tenses oft he imperfect or the future anterior, providing a linguistic
metaphor for the experience ofsc lfhood.j ust as with these two tenses, a person finds that
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s/hc either "has been" or "will have already arrived" at all times. never existing in the
moment i Laca nia n Suhje ct. 63). Samuel Weber explicates this experience in The Return
10 Freud:
It isanirredueible remainderor remnant thatwillco ntinually prevent the subject
from ever becoming entirely self..identical. In the psychoanalytica l perspective.
then. memory becomes something very different from what it was for
metaphysics - not because 01''1 future that the subject will never be able to catch
up with fully. but because every attempt by the subjec t of the unconscious to
grasp its history inevitably divides that history into a past that. n il' from having
taken place once and for all. is always yet to come. Consequently. the living
present I/ehelli/ige Gegelllm rl l (Husserl) ofthe subject emerges as a focal point
whose actua lity can reside in an ant icipa ted belatedness. (9)
for l.acan, the experience of time is always dictated by a peculiarly external inclusion:
one is never "in the moment" so much as one is stretched between the poles of the past
and the future. regarding the present while ell route. "Time.' as such. is a feeling of
absence. of loss and insufficiency. a division within the self. 0 wonder. then. that the
concept ofvt imclcssness" may seem an attractive option.
lf we examine Lacan's theories. and their inheritance from Freud. we lind the
timelessness that Zwicky finds so attractive in the latter has another permutation in the
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supplementary theories supplied by Lacan. Particularly. in the analytic solution to the
future antcriority experienced by the subject. In the following passage fro rn vl 'hc
Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis." Lucan addresses the way
Freud collapses time in the subject during analysis. when personal historical material is
dealt with ill the present: "That is to say. he annuls the timesfor understanding in favor of
the moments ofconcluding which precipitate the subject's meditation toward deciding the
meaning to be attached to the early event" (2 13). In other words. in the moment of
persona l epiphany. wherein the analysand learns to articulate the root of his/her inner
confl icts, one rewrites history in such a way that the moment is the only history that is
relevant. Consequently. the feeling of being caught between the " imperfect" and the
" future anterior" is eliminated. because in this experience of "historica l" revision. the past
and the present arc collapsed together. essential difference elided. It is in this vcry
moment that Lucan places truth-value:
Let's be categorical: in psychoanalytic anamnesis. what is at stake is not reality.
but truth. because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by
conferring on them the sense of necessities to come. such as they are constituted
by the scant freedom through which the subject makes them present. ( ibid, 213)
"Anamnesis" is. in psychoanalytieal terms. the process by which one examines past
events in order to understand their influence on their actions; its Greek root implies a
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"loss or forgetting." and is philosophically detai led in Plato's Meno , when Socrates
attempts to demonstrate that the soul is immortal because it knows all things - one
merely has to "remember' what one does not know. This term has a specific use in the
psychoanalytical context: in order to "c laimt the past so that it is not something merely
"wai ting to occur: ' in order to configure "reality" so that it is "true: ' the subject must
provide a context 1'01'understanding historical material in the present, thereby consciously
ameliorating the differences or the past, present. and (consequently) future. This
experience is very much "timeless," in the sense that the difference of time is eliminated;
it is also, in Lacanian analysis, the closest that the conscious subject can come to
experiencing the timelessness oft he unconscious.
JAA n:llllncs is :lndAcsthctic
While Zwicky is apparently not familiar with this particular aspect or the
evolution or the psychoanalytic tradition, the mechanism of the experience or time, and
psychoanalytical anamnesis, as outlined by Lacan, bears certain likenesses to Zwicky's
idea or the lyric. Part or the distinction Zwicky makes between "analysis" and "lyr ic" is
that the former is absolutely rooted in time; because it wants to construct a causal
narrative. it must proceed linearly. step by step in temporal structure. She contrasts this
with the structure of music (a comment on structure that we can safely assume is also
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meant to apply to poetics as well):
A musical composition. like any piece of writing. unfolds through time. But in the
way a flower - that closes for the night - unfolds. Arguments arc ol time; they
cannot be unfolded . in this sense. any more than a sheet of glass can folded, or
unfolded. in space. (12)
"f olding: ' of course. is again a metaphorical descript ion. but one has good reason to
understand this claim as referring to the way that artistic structure relics on clements such
as juxtaposition. the shifting focus of attention that never forgets the ges talt . and internal
resonance in order to confer a sense of completeness to the overall form of the piece. It is
this sense that creates the air of structural "necessity"; Zwicky comments that " In lyric.
nothing is accidental: if a detail can occur in a composition. this possibi lity must be
written into the detail itself" (2 12). The chain of an artistic piece must be inscribed in
every part: that is to say, the beginning must prefigure the ending, and the ending must
recall the beginning (and everything in between). Consequently, lyric is atemporal , in this
specific sense. of being able to disrupt the experience of passing time such that the
"beginning" (history, the imperfect) is entirely contiguous with the "end" (the ideal. the
future anterior). Of course. if one compares the passage of poetic form through time,
towards the "timeless" end implied by knowledge of the entire structure of the poem. one
can observe precisely the same structure at work in lyric as that described by Lacan in his
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approach of time in analytic treatment: history (in this case the progression of poetic
form) is reordered in the present such that past cont ingencies become necessities. Poetic
composition. then. is not so much a product of the primary processes as it is of analytical
(/ 1/(/ 1111/(: .1';.1'. the "loss of forgetting," where unconscious material becomes inscribed in the
conscious mind. Here again. Zwicky's criticisms of Freud appear to have missed the
mark; she suggests that Freud and the post-Freudian tradition ignore the possible meaning
of unconscious material in favour of conscious. rational thought. It would appear that in
psychoanalytic technique. the unconscious must be inscribed. but it need not be rational.
and this is precisely the effect Zwicky proposes poetry can supplement for traditional
philosophy.
"Loss-in-connexion, connexion-in-loss" is ultimately a summation of the lyric
Iorm, and its truth is almost entirely experiential; one has to have encountered the feeling
summoned by the statement oneself in order to understand it. What Lacan provides
Zwicky is a framework through which one would be able to understand why this
statement makes sense: an adventurous. educated guess as to the reason that this
particular intuition occurs in those sensitive enough to trace its contours in themselves.
lie did not attempt to create this scaffolding in order to empty this insight of its meaning.
however; instead. we must conclude that Lucan is as concerned with the nature of
"wisdom" as Zwicky. and guided by similar impulses. Both Zwicky's "lyric" and Lucan's
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"analysis" primarily concern themselves with the cxtirnacy of the subject, the relationship
one has with the ideals of the self and the other, and the flux that those poles engender,
The focus of attention. then, is clear; the question remains as to what is to be done about
it. both through lyric, and through analysis.
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C ha pter -t Lyric Ana lysis : T he End of Devel opment
Z wicky's and Laca n's outlines of met aphor, history. and "full " speech are indeed
"re sona nt." if not entirel y (acc identa lly) identical. What is crucial for distinguishin g
them. however. is what they prop ose to be the guid ing end . the telos, to personal
development. as dictated by their model s o f per sona l identit y. Zwicky, in speaking o f
lyric. is attempting to out line a poetic goal that has ramifications for one' s personal life : it
is an aes thet ic that pro mo tes "w isdo m: ' or bette r living. Laca n, in co ntradis tinc tion , was
a practi sin g ana lyst, who co nce rned himsel f wi th the me ntal we ll be ing of his pa tients .
lli s essential meth od , howe ver, was Freud' s " ta lking cure ," whereby he atte mpted to have
his pat ient s articulate their own menta l blocks so that they might be able to approach
them : in eff ect , Lacan attempts to prom ote sel f con sciou sne ss and rea lizati on . I doubt
many would argu e if I were to suggest. then , that both Zwicky and Lacan adv ocate
models ofse l f' improvem ent that dire ct them selves tow ard s "wisdom" (Zwicky throu gh
exa mple, Laca n thro ugh presc ription). T he slight differences bet wee n the reali zation of
th is goa l are worth distinguishing. how ever. To that end. I am go ing to ask. and attempt to
answer. a que st ion that wi ll demon strate those conceptual differences: is poetr y analy sis?
T he qu esti on is somewhat g lib. but not with out merit : it is cle ar that in her pur suit o f
" lyr ic: ' Z wicky sugges ts that poetr y is a whick ofself-realization and improvement
throu gh exp ression. [I'Z wicky is correct about the enterpri se of lyr ic phi losophy. then
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perhaps some of the work of poetry (as defined by Zwicky) resembles analysis. I will
indicate the extent of this overlap in this chapter, by comparing the end of lyric, and the
end of analysis.
4.1 Desire and Fantas y: The Direction of the Treatment
Before I can approach the end of the treatment in Lacanian psychoanalysis, I must
first lay out some of its presuppositions. The first is the essential relationship of fantasy to
desire and the obje t a. In Looking Am )!: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through
Popular Culture, Slavoj Zizek clearly outlines the relationship of fantasy to desire:
The fundamental point of psychoanalysis is that desire is not something given in
advance, but something that has to be constructed - and it is precisely the role of
fantasy to give the coordinates of the subject's desire, to specify its object, to
locate the position the subject assumes in it. It is only through fantasy that the
subject is constituted as desiring: through f an/my, we learn how to desire. (6)
In the Lacanian topology of the mind. desire is a necessary effect. the product of
alienation and the subject's birth into the field of language; however, the direction of that
desire is. at least potentially, endlessly various. Between the tumult of the Symbolic. the
Imaginary. and the Real, the subject experiences the construction of the fantasy, which
channels desire towards some specific goal, represented by the objet a, or the signifier
that denotes the other.
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The three or ders, the Symbolic. Imagi nary . and Rea l. a rt: for Lacan the triad ofthe
psyche. an operating mode l o ft he hum an min d . I have alrea dy e laborated on the
functions o f the Symbolic and the Imaginary in de scribi ng the opera tion of the paternal
func tion a nd the metap hor. but I mu st add a comment here on the Real. The Real is the
limit o f the illu sion fostered by the j oint func tions of the Sy mbo lic and the Imaginary. the
end o f the fantasy. It is when the subj ect discovers that the wo rld exceeds its
expectatio ns, tha t the fantasy is in some way insuffic ient. In the opera tio n o f a healthy,
neuro tic mind , fantasy will "b reak down " aga in and aga in. meetin g its limit and
co nseq uently rcconfig uring to its new parameters . To give an example, wh en one first
g limpses one's parent s as peop le, rather than as mo no lithic figures in one' s life . the Rea l
int rudes o n one's fantasie s and one begin s the work of providing a new fra mework for
that info rmation. Typically. what will direct the subject tow ards thi s lim it is desire :
specifi cully. the "o bjec t cau se o f desire ." a.
The obje t (/ is abso lute ly cen tral to Lacanian ana lys is, as it repre sent s the directi on
o f desi re, the centr al organizing feature o f an indi vidual fanta sy. The subjec t direct s its
de sire toward s its limit. which it symbolizes as a partic ular that cannot be rea lized . To
give a simple examp le, we can imagi ne a person wh o desires the perfec t cup ofcoffee: in
its pursui t, the perso n dri nks co ffee a fter coffee , but because of the natur e of s ignifi cation,
no sing le cup wi ll ever be the idea l. Once it has bee n con sum ed . the signifier moves on to
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the next cup. thc previous one is forgotten, and the subject will forever be craving the
next cup. This cycle . which is central to the human psyche. is formula ted as the central
point between the three orders because it is at once I) signified (the Symbolic). 2)
imagined as " meaningful" or desirous (the Imaginary) and 3) ultimately exposed as
insuffic ient (the Real). Fantasy is constant ly directing itself towards this object.
Lucan accep ts this cycle as entirely natural; it is the motor of all progress . and not
problematic itse lf. However, within this cycle, certain problems can arise. Perhaps the
subject pursues co ffee at the exclusion of aII else. perhaps she blames hersel fo r the
people around her for her failure to attai n the perfect cup. Once the subject begins to
suffer from the particu lar arrangement of her fantasy. it is the analyst's job to intervene .
The Lacanian analyst will try not to give his/her patient terms for what they suff er, but
instead provoke them into articulating the problems themselves: in this way. the subject
learns to examine its fantas ies and adjust them in such a way that problemat ic impasses in
the fantasy which result in pain and displeasure are mitigated . This sorting out ofpa inful
symptoms is the initial goa l of psychoanalysis.
Although the analyst is concerned with help ing the analysand to elim inate harmfu l
symptoms from his/her day- to-day life in the short term. the analyst is also concerned
with eventually bringing about the "e nd of the analysis" ; then. the analyst will attempt to
have the analysand "traverse the fantasy.' Lacan represents the traversal of the fantasy
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(also known as fa traversec ; differently throughout his career, but clinically the analyst
can determi ne that the analysand no longer requires analysis when s/he displays the
following two traits: when the analysand can speak about him/herself without
"addressing" the analyst or changing the content of their speech for benefit of the
audience. which suggests that s/he has broken through "empty speech" which conforms
to expectation; when the analysand can articulate the truth of his/her desire, devoid of the
fantasy that the next object designated as the obje t a will satisfy desire. Lacan suggests
that when the patient is able to display these traits, then one can infer that s/he is no
longer compelled to "settle the accounts," to attempt to recuperate thc loss represented by
its alienation, the experience of castration. This point is essential: the subject never
regains what is lost; instead, the subject ceases to demand its lost content. reconfigu ring
its expectations in such a way that it no longer tries to avenge itself on the Other. To be a
Lacanian analyst. one must first undergo analysis oneself and reach this stage. as it is
understood that to be the kind of Other one needs to be for the analysand. one must not
attempt to unconsiously influence the therapeutic process; to perform analysis. one must
bc able to see the analysand as subject, not as Other; one must let the Other bc as it is.
What is of note in thetrm'ersee to this study is that it is. ina t least one way. a
product of anamnesis. Freud wondered in "Analysis Terminable or Interminable" whether
or not it was possible to complete analysis. or ifi t was by definition a forever incomplete
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process: as the neurotic is never. truly. "cured" so much as divested of problematic
symptoms. the question remained as to whether or not analysis was a process that could
ever genuinely end. Lacan, however. sets a clear, practical end to analysis. marked by a
change in the analysand's speech. The form that this change takes is outlined briefly by
Lacan in "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," where he
writes "[a jnalysis can have as its goal only the advent oft rue speech and the subject's
realization of his history in its relation to a future" (249). The hallmark of full speech.
then, is the "timeless" association of the past with the future. specifica lly understood in
the Freudian sense of history configuring itself to the understanding in the moment. but
with the Lacanian twist of the future anterior supplementing the "now" with the "about to
be." In other words, the goal of psychoanalysis is to bring past. present. and future into
one contiguous space. Of course, this goal in no way implies static wisdom: the end of
analysis can also be formulated as the commitment to analysis itsclf( in what appears to
be a stark contrast to Wittgcnstein's "end of philosophy"). even if one no longer has need
of the analyst. Just as the subject exists in a state of flux, so too must self understanding.
Lucan is perfectly aware of this. and is careful not to speak too glibly of the end of
analysis. even where he may speak of the end of Ir eaimell I. In a sense. analysis must
become its own reward. a self-perpetuating process that no longer requires the guide of
an analyst: the end of analysis is the internalization of the process. the ability to ride the
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c res t oltha t prog ress rathe r than att empting to "cat ch up" with it. To have trav ersed the
fantasy is to have beco me comforta ble in that moment o f ch an ge , pe rhaps eve n to live in
it "as ifit is horne."
4.2 Wisdom, Me tap hor, and Livi ng in the Wor ld as If It is Ho me
Zwicky a lmo st definitively present s the poet as ha vin g res po ns ib ilities to her self,
to her craft , and to her audie nce . To read her writing on lyri c and met aph or is to see
someone wh o beli eves ge nuinely that enco unteri ng a well -wri tten poem is to better
ones el f implicitly (so long as the engagement is rea l). She suggests that a goo d poe m will
help us re-for ge our ex pec tatio ns of the world , re inv igora t ing our per son al lan gu ages so
that the y ca n, once aga in, " mea n" lo r us: " Metaphor result s from an ove r-r id ing of
calcified ge sture s o f thou ght by bein g" (WM L8 ). A cr ucia l as pect to thi s enter prise,
agai n, is desir e : lyri c des ire to be precise, tha t whieh posit s as its goal " liv ing in the world
as ifi t is hom e ." So me inves tigation is needed to unp ack prec isel y w ha t th is eloqu ent
phra se mea ns.
Zw icky cha rac te rizes lyr ic desire as ai mi ng tow ards a parti cul ar k ind o f
aphanas is, the era sure of the se lf. Thi s d irecti on ari se s fro m the feel ing that " We
expe rience the burden ofour capacityfor language as loss - tho ug h we ra re ly recogni ze
that this is the burde n. tha t wha t we have lost is s ilence" (LI' 246) . Zwicky cha rac teri zes
lyr ic as a long ing for the pre -ling uistic. I(Jr tha t which exceeds mer e wor ds or order ; the
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self yearns to be. perhaps. "unborn" in lyric. The Lacaniun element of this description
should be noted: in the Lacanian topology of desire. what is at stake is always the desire
oft he Other. and what is lost is always the pre-linguistic bliss of union with the (m)Other.
What Zwicky is describing. if one ascribes any truth whatsoever to the psychoanalytical
model. is the desire to be one with the mother. and the alienation that comes from the
name/no of the father (which. for Lacan, is the essential basis lo r desire). However,
Zwicky recognizes that this desire is essentially impossible. because it is the very
refutation of desire itself:
But the fulfillment of lyric desire would necessarily exclude experience of
self; and consequently, our capacity lor tool-use. A being with this capacity is. in
the exercise of that capacity. essentially separated from the world.
To fuse the self with the world is to forfeit the self. (248)
This passage is not a call to fall upon our own swords. to lose ourselves: rather. it is
recognition that to be a human being is to wish for things we cannot have (already. we
can see the objet l/ emerging in this model). Instead. she crucially suggests that the aim of
lyric and the result of lyric are two very different things: " What lyric desires is fusion
with the world; what it achieves is an integrated speech" (1.1'248). The similarity of this
term. "in tegrated speech." to Lucan's "full speech" tempts one to suppose already that
they are the same thing; more proof is needed. however.
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What is "in tegrated speech"? It is. for Zwicky. the product of what she calls
"domesticity." or. as mentioned above. "living in the world as if it is home.' She explains
this concept in Lyric Philosophy:
Lyric integration is thought's ideal. although it is not lyric's telos.
Domesticity is the telos of human being. as we arc capable of
understanding it. although it is not philosophy's ideal.
Domestic thought is post-philosophical: release from the ideal of complete
clarity: what makes us capable of stopping doing philosophy when we want to.
(286)
Domesticity for Zwicky is a kind ofvalue-invested living. where the very failure of lyric
pursuit allows onc to meditate on the worth of one's own Iife in something like sustained
wonder. Zwicky characterizes it as the abililty not only to cease doing philosophy (again.
wearing her Wittgensteinian intluence on her sleeve) but of becoming in some way able
to control desire. to not fixate on one goal doggedly. The phrase "when we want to" is
significant: Zwicky is not describing the end of desire. but a relationship with it. a
de tente. This relationship to one's desire manifests itself' in one's "integrated:' "alive"
speech that reflects one's position.
At this point. it appears clear that Lacan and Zwicky arc using different terms to
describe the same phenomenon: an understanding of one's desire that allows one to resist
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the anxiety of alienation. which ultimately imbues one's speech with a quality that
exceeds mere instrumental. syntactical use. This comparison should come as no surprise:
what Zwicky suggests is that the responsibility of the poet. and the product of poetry. is
attentiveness to the incomplete nature of subjectivity, where organizational tools like
metaphor and lyric provoke the imaginations of those who engage them (be they poet or
reader), disrupting "rea lity" and shedding light on the assumptions that gave rise to that
construetion. In Lacanian terms, a good poem will interrupt the metonymic slippage that
suggests totality in individual experience. Consequently. the violent space encountered in
the epiphany of lyric becomes a place of understanding. Almost certainly. this is what
Zwicky means by "find ing a home in the world": rather than constructing a static position
to cling to. it is becoming comfortable with the flux of a shining language that adapts to
the world. To be "at home" is to effectively adapt one's reality to the Real as necessary.
and to recognize and accept the flux of one's subjectivity.
.t.3A Touch of the Divine: Oracularity and the Tuclte
In 2003. Jan Zwicky published an article titled "Oracularity." where she once
again valorizes a mode of thought that she believes is unjustly maligned in contemporary
philosophical circles: the "oracular." Zwicky examines that term as used by Northrop
Frye in his .:uuuomy ofCriticism. and the way he relates the oracular to the lyric. She
disagrees with him on a fundamental point. using Frye as the starting point of her own
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argument:
I do not think the oracular is the 'ground' of lyric: the two are. I shall urge.
di ffe rcnt species of the same genus [... j The fundamental point of connection
between lyric and oracular utterance is, rather. to be found in their relation to a
certain type of insight - one that perceives a radical but non-systematic integrity
in some phenomenon. (490-1)
In order to illustrate this point, Zwicky outlines a scenario wherein, while doing a
crossword, someone is supplied the answer "contiguous" by an over-the-shoulder player
(specifica lly a librarian in this example). This answer appears correct fix one clue. but its
presence in the puzzle would suggest that other, already completed responses were false.
forcing a radical re-examination of the crossword's gestalt. Prom this situation, Zwicky
provides her definition of oracularity: " In this word-puzzle, oracular utterance works like
the keyword dropped by the librarian: it realigns vision by forcing consideration of
alternative linked responses, which in turn substantiate, deepen, and elaborate the
realignment itself ' (492-3) . The key difference between lyric and oracularity, then,
appears to be that theoraeularsupp/ies lyric: it is the invocation of lyric experience in
one subject from the utterance of another.
Similarly, Lucan speaks of the moment of intervention, when the analyst notes a
stopping block in the speech of the analysand and draws his/her attention to it. as the
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niche , or "touch." l.acanian analysis diner s from other schools oft reatment in that he
wished to avoid the codification ofm ental diseases, especial ly when speaking with the
analysand. In his view. diagnosis simply gives the subject another tool for resisting
analysis. a way to wall off fantasy without genuine confrontation. Instead, Lacan suggests
that what must happen is the analyst must try to direct the analysand's attention to the
particular stumbling blocks of his/her personal fantasy. The form of this ..touch" can be
almost anything: the analyst might ask a question along the lines of rw hy is this mist: so
important to you." point out a slip, or, in the case of Lucan's famous "short" or "variable
length sessions: ' the analyst might dramatically end the session, ejecting the patient from
thc room or leaving abrupt ly. Bruce Fink describes the process:
The analyst's interest in such slips. double cntendres, and garbled speech arouses
the patient's interest in them: and though the analyst. by punctuating. has not
provided a specific meaning. the patient begins to try to attribute meaning to
thcm. (CI 15)
The purpose of such behaviour is to direct the analysand's attention to a particular facet of
his/her own mind. such that s/he is able to "work it out" through association on his/her
own. An apt metaphor is that the analyst provides a fin ger so that the patient may tit: a
bow in a ribbon; it is the jo b of the analyst to hold the moment in place.
In other words. this relationship, where the analyst who "disturbs" the patient's
Carpenter 56
placid assumptions about reality and his/her self and coaxes him/her into forging new
symbolic associations that help break out of a set of symptoms. is oracular. One could
hardly call it a coincidence that Lacan himself considers "oracular speech" in his
seminars, using it in a fashion only j ust removed from Zwicky's. He writes in "The
Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power" that the analyst must be aware
of the full power of his/her words:
As an interpreter of what is presented to me in words or deeds. I choose my own
oracle and articulate it as I please. sole master of my ship after God; and while. of
course. I am far from able to weigh the whole effect of my words. I am well
aware of the fact and strive to attend to it. ("The Direction of the Treatment and
the Principles of Its Power." 49 I)
Of course. in quintessential Lucanian style. this statement itselfi s oracular. relying on the
metaphor ofv choosing an oracle" to communicate its central point: that is. there is force
in psychoanalytical observation that outstrips the will of the analyst. What is crucial for
the treatment is to be aware of this effect. and la ster it as best as is possible. Bruce ri nk
outlines the reasoning lo r this technique: Analysts make analysands re-associate by
"providing interpretations that are enigmatic and polyvalent. The analysand tried to figure
them out. at the conscious level inevitably. but also at the unconscious level. Such
interpretations resonate [original emphasis]: they put the unconscious to work" (Clinical
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Introduction. 46). The incidental resemblance here to Zwicky's own language is
significant. These analyst's suggestions are designed to frustrate the subject at the rational
level. where their ambiguities circumvent the desire for "one true: ' wholly signified
meaning, but continue to act upon the unconscious where such distinctions do not matter.
The therapeutic e ffe ct of these interjections comes from their engagement with the non-
rational part of the mind. Of course, this is precisely the aspect of Freud's work in 'T he
Unconscious" that Zwicky feels ignored in modern philosophical, and even post-Freudian
work. What she misses is that Lucan rescues this aspect of Freud from the prevailing
Freudian tradition, and forms the kernel of his practice around it, even using in parallel
much the same terminology to describe these processes, notably "orac ular" and
"resonant" (or at least. the same terms in translation). It appears that, as readers of Freud.
Zwicky and Lacan arc very much in agreement.
However, it is in this relationship, the "oracular" one, where the difference
between Zwicky's lyric and Lucan's psychoanalytical practice can be observed. What
Zwicky is advocating is primarily work upon onesel f: whatever oracular effect it may
have is not incidental but rather the eff ect of a shared cultural context. Zwicky writes in
lVil/gens/ei n Eleg ies that language is a public phenomenon. echoing Wittgenstein's
observation; given this assumption, it makes sense that the work of reinvigorating
language will have a general therapeutic effect if it is indeed an instrument of self-
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betterment. The analyst, in contrast. must first remove her/himselff rom the relationship
with a patient, and attempt to engage the patient on her/his own terms in order to relieve
painful symptoms of neurosis. This point is broad, and perhaps obvious, but must not be
understated. It is not my intention to suggest that poetry and analysis are identical
pursuits, but rather that the project of lyric, and the project of analysis, as envisioned by
Zwicky and Lucan, share certain features, presuppositions, and goals. Zwicky asks in
Lyric Philosophy " Why arc we academics so embarrassed when people earnestly assert
that philosophy addresses eternal questions]...]? Do we think that such questions don't
exist? Have been solved?" (36) . Finding a similar definition of wisdom in two disparate
modes of thought might assure her that there is hope that the question is still asked.
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Cha pter 5: C r it ica l Ana lysis: Readi ng Zwicky's Poetry
The discussio n that has taken place until now in this thesis would amount to little
i f it did not relate to the poetic techniques at the heart of the investigation. To that end. I
will now apply the theoretical system examined previously as crit ical tools to Zwicky's
poetry. specifically her first three major collections: Wittgenstein Elegies, The Nell' Room.
and Songs /in' Relinquishing the Earth, I will also make a note here as to my assumptions
regarding these texts: to my eye. Zwicky writes, and perhaps more important ly collects.
her poems with respect for the entire work of each publication. In Wittgenstein Elegies.
the format is clearly short pieces contributing to long poems, While her later books are
not explicitly written in this way. their flow. juxtaposition. and shared thematic concerns
indicate an aware ness of the collection's structure as a whole. As such. I will examine the
poems in each of these collections as pieces of a larger work. To avo id the awkwardness
of avoiding gcndercd pronouns or writing s/hc or his/her. when it is unclear who the
speaker is in a poem. [ will default to the feminine pronoun.
Another facet of my approac h to criticism of Zwicky's works is to treat these
poems as being. in some way. philosophical treatises. As I haw discussed previously.
poetry is. for Zwicky. a working through. a form of intellectual investigation that aims
towards an end, even ifit docs not achieve. or even eventually rejects. itBecause
language and the way it functions with respect to meaning is a philosophical
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preoccupat ion lor Zwicky, I will pay special attention to the ways that that subject
emerges in the poems. My argument throughout is that in enacting her particular form of
" Lyric Philosophy," by creating meaning by way of "resonance," Zwicky is creating
psychoanalytically rich texts; in other words. that the aesthetic that Zwicky has defined as
"lyric" coincides almost entirely with features of speech that the analyst would seek out
in an analysand. I am unable to prove that these texts are, indeed. lyric, as Zwicky resists
presenting objective criteria for evaluating this; indeed, the subjective experience of lyric
is at the very heart of what Zwicky gestures towards, so I will have to take it on faith that
the reader will have felt Zwicky's work as "resonant." What I can do is point out the
psychoanalytical "truth" of her poems, both in terms of how the structures of meaning are
presented, and in how the speaker of the poems presents symptoms related to the
alienation of existing in languagc. If I can prove that this is the case, then I feel that there
are grounds for suggesting that lyric and symptom are coincident, if not identical, A side
effect (symptom?) of this reading is that one can observe a progressio n in Zwicky's
collections, a narrative arc that spans not only each individual book of poetry, but also
each publication, wherein the poet's progress parallels that of the subject undergoing
analysis. I do not want to elaborate on this point overmuch, but I will usc it as a framin g
device for my "analysis" of Zwicky's poetry.
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S.1 Wittgenstei n Elegies
lJ'illgel1s/eil1Elegies. Zw icky's first major co llec tio n of poet ry. is an inten sely
phil osop hica l work that may trade poe tic fo rm for philoso phic al investigat ion : wh ile
Zwicky was later able to integrate her investigat ion s into langu age and thou ght more
fully wi th her poet ry. the Elegies rathe r attempt to take phi losophic al cla y and mou ld it
into poet ry. T ha t this endeavo ur is not entire ly succes sfu l is understandable, as this is
Zwicky 's first major pub licati on . In this mu lti-p art poeti c essay. Zwicky write s in and
aro und Wittgen ste in's phi losop hy, ech oing his word s. makin g them " ro und" poe try. and
also exa m ining his biograp hy (The second chapter. "The Death of Georg Trakl." for
instance. refe rs to a yo ung poet who received the ben e fit o fWit tgens te in's pat ronage).
One o r the avowed pur poses of this poe tic essay is to de mo nstra te the "c rys ta lline"
character of Witt gc nstei n's thou gh t. or disce rning and presenting the lyrical natu re or his
writing. particularly in the Tractatu s. Indeed. it would be six yea rs be fore Zwicky
publi shed Lyri c Philosophy . and many of the ideas ex pressed in that boo k are present here
ill utero, lJ'i/lge/lS/eill Elegies pro vides a footho ld into Zwicky's poetry that is less evide nt
in her more po lished. matur e wo rk.
Iris Murd oc h (a writer whom Zwic ky cites severa l times in her phi loso phica l
work s) once fam ou sly rema rked that it never cea sed to be signifi cant to as k what a
philoso pher is a fraid o f, impl yin g that ind ividua l phi losophi es o ften address, at least
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obliquely. those immediate fears and concerns; Lacan would certainly agree. 1J"lllgellsleill
Elegies may be identified as Zwicky's most anxious book; it is where she is least in
command of her own voice as a poet, and also where the fear of meaninglessness
manifests itself most apparently. Using Lacanian analysis as a tool of interpretation. it
becomes clear that Zwicky constructs an "alienated" voice in this book, and that the fear
of meaninglessness stems from a desire to return to a pre-linguistic state of non-identity.
The first chapter, "Philosopher's Stone," begins with a strident assertion of belief;
Zwicky outlines a thesis, stating
We will only see things
Stark and dead if we see only things
Themselves and not the pattern that informs them.
What must be understood, not collectivity, not
Substance, is the depth of an embrace. (15)
Zwicky writes with confidence, almost with swagger. She is stating the facts, criticizing a
host of approac hes to the experience of the world and asserting that they miss something
crucial: this aspect of "embrace,' of meaning in a broader structure than mere existence.
Already. we see Zwicky fashioning metaphors ofv lyric"; although she has not yet begun
using this term to describe her specific poetics. she is here describing an aesthetics of
unity that exceeds collectivity in a way that will suggest her later work. This assertion
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will inform her entire body of work. and it is given here with power and authority.
Of course. we are to understand " Philosopher's Stone" in two ways: fi rst. it is the
alchemical master key. that which will transform lead into gold and transmute ignorance
into wisdom, the prize of philosophy. Second, it is that which is sought. the grail of
philosophy. that which is continually pursued but never obtained, the objet a. These two
meanings of i'philosopher's stone," both implicit in the presentation of this philosophical
goal. suggest a certain ambiguity to it: on one hand, it is fully realized, sta ted,
understood; on the other, it is tentative, unachieved, distant. This curious ambivalence
asserts itself variously, in lines like
Immense turn in the deep black,
Small points of light. faint gleam or slash
Along some buried axis, white reticulated wink.
Size only guessed but staggering: enormous swing
of infinite compounded rhythms through the
Unthought reach. Each note pure. perfectly
Distinct: the graveness of a star. Whom did this grow
Within? (13)
There is awe in these lines. which attempt to distill the feeling of gravity that attends
seeing things as a piece of a great whole. but there arc also notes of distress: lights slash.
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black immenseness staggers, stars arc grave. The question asked here. " Whom did this
growl Within?" is shocked. uncertain. but convinced that the product is essentially
personal: it is this revelation that opens the image to analysis. The l.acanian response is
simply that what is glimpsed is the unconscious. and as such. it grew within, and is now
only recognized in its cxtirnate dimensions. Lacanian analysis would suggest that what is
being seen is the Real of the unconscious, the brief experience of seeing the way that
one's fantasies shape the world. at the moment when they become alien and other; it is
recognizing the depths of oneself that typically goes unnoticed. Zwicky is not a Lacanian,
but implied in the question is the not yet admitted answer that it grew within. a vague
feeling that results in the final assertion of the piece " We will be different." Analytically
speaking. the idea has been planted. and the analysand is on the cusp of a breakthrough
towards the traversec. Poetically speaking, the speaker is opening the intellectual site
where one will experience the work of art. creating the mood of wonder and surprise. The
two effect s arc not dissimi lar.
The second chapter, "In the Elder Days of Art," contcxtualizcs this goal as the
result or a specific proje ct. that of art. and is as elegant and complete a summary of the
hopes and guiding ideals of lyric inquiry as one could ask for. Even the title of this piece
echoes Wittgcnstcin's epigrammatic "end of philosophy," suggesting that art. and
philosophy. have a final resting place and implying a telos to art. However. it is important
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to note tha t the "elder days " arc mer ely " near" the end o f art, and not yet ar rived ; here. it
is clear tha t the " philosopher's stone" is only a project ed ideal , not yet achieve d. but the
speaker at least is able to sugges t the path by which it may be reali zed . Indeed, in the
following passage from "T he Elde r Days," she exa m ines the way in which phil osophi cal
inquiry prog resse s, co nc lud ing with its inevitable frustration :
Work in phil osoph y is work upon
Ones elf: s low chip and erasure,
Fab ric first gro ws rough, then thin,
The tex ture ofa life . So rarely
Under gentleness , unless another's, other
Hands to hold , to bear the weight ,
Mo re seldom point the way. So so lita ry
Work turns ritual. Tike ritual rots
Unless one clin gs to inner sense,
Digs nails hard in the darkli ng core , seeks
For a rubric ho nes t as a kiss. ( 42)
Zwicky sets out a relat ively elaborate schema in a few short lines : for one, phi losop hy is
a form of self imp rovem ent (the emp has is on "s low chip and eras ure" ec hoes the Socra tic
asse rtion that philoso phy is " preparing for de ath " ). As well , it is, or mu st be. erotic,
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searching for a hand to hold and expressing its desire as honestly as a kiss docs for
another. The objec t of this desire alternates between external objects (the kiss) and the
interior (the "inner sense" of the "darkling core"), suggesting that the philosopher 's "s low
chip and erasure" is a dialectical progress between two poles: inside and out. The
philosopher's task, then, is one of constant self appraisal, where one must examine
oneself in relation to the other. Or. perhaps. recognize the sclf in the other.
The structure of philosophical progress outlined in "The Elder Days of Art" is
essentially lyric, aimed towards an impossible end whose frustration embodies a kind of
revelation. As well, while it is certain that Zwicky had no intention of writing a Lacanian
topology of thc self in this poem. it maps itselfpr ecisely onto that structure. suggesting
the unconscious, the Real. and the objet a in observing the direction of philosophy. The
"knotting" of ritual (the very metaphor Lucan uses lo r the intertwining of the three
orders) implies the entropy of reality without the interrupting intrusion of the Real. here
figured as the unconscious (the darkling core), directed outwards by way of the "rubric"
of the kiss. In this case. the kiss is a symbol that is able to stand in the place of the Other
in this fantasy, allowing desire to be wholly self-situated (the kiss belonging more to the
self than. say. the "hands of another"). The culmination of this long poem reinforces this
tension between the sclf and Other:
77U11 \I'e c/o mean , one overwhelming fact
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Shall tear the gleaming axis of the universe
From buried stasis, wrench it, live and
Open-mouthed about the fixed point of our need. (43)
IIcrc, the fact of meaning brings the universe to the subject in an "open-mouthed,"
fellating image of phallocentric language; the subject is recognized as "meaningful" at
the site of need, suggesting the closure of erotic desire. Once again, "meaning" is situated
at the level of desire, and in this case the neurotic fantasy suggests that this fact causes
the Other to desire the subject in turn, thereby reconciling the Lacanian effect of
alienation outlined in chapter 3.2 of this thesis. And yet, while the "ove rwhelming fact"
that "we do mean" appears obvious, there remains a certain distrust of it. It is a violent
fact that tears one away 1"0111 "buried stasis," forcing one into the sexual image at the end
of this passage. Meaning, here, is essentially traumatic.
Indeed, while these poems concern themselves primarily with change, they arc
also, in a sense, "obsessed" with fear. "To see/ Is to be unafraid/ to cast away the ladder/
We have cherished" writes Zwicky ( 15), again echoing the Wittgcnsteinian sentiment that
the object of philosophy is to cease performing philosophy. However, throughout the
collection, this fear constant ly emerges; the speaker in "The Death of Georg Trakl"
dreams "If only we/ Are strong enough to sec. If only/ We endure the blindness and the
loss" (26), while also noting that "Purity of heart eludes me" (23): apparently the speaker
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is not strong enough. I/O ! brave enough. The self reproach in these poems curiously
coincides with the absolute certainty with which thc "philosopher's stone:' that meaning
comes from thc imagination, that one must embrace the entire structure of language to
understand, is asserted again and again. While Zwicky is constructing a philosophical
thesis. a specific fantasy, she is also creating a strong emotional reaction to that goal.
characterized by anxiety, remorse, and self-flagellation. The desperation in the line "If
only we are strong enough" implies that "we" (perhaps best read as a collective "we" that
includes thc rcaderj arc nor,
What fault spurs such disdain for oneself? Why is the fourth chapter of the
collection entitled "Confessions"? These questions arc what link Zwicky's sense of lyric
to the Lacanian account of language most clearly, specifically through thc mechanism of
alienation. The guilt of the speaker comes forth strongly in "The Elder Days of Art" when
she says " Wc will never know/ Whether it is a strength or a weakness/ To have survived
where others could not" (34). Once again, while it appears that the speaker is asking an
open question, the answer is hinted at in the asking of the question: the curious question
itself suggests that "survival" is a weakness. But in what sense? Lucan's response would
be that the speaker experiences the alienation of language, that the impositions of
linguistic existence are presenting themselves as a limit. an insuffici ency: the speaker has
not made peace with her position in the cultural frame and yearns for the pre-linguistic, to
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be one once again with "mother," There are multiple intimations of pre-linguistic bliss in
the collection; consider the following. where Zwicky writes "Turn. world. away/ Through
emptiness to some blank space. smudged. filled with/ Sand. Crumble these shadows.
indeciphcr them. make dust" (3 1), confla ting death with what could be considered a
return to the womb. at least insofar as one is "indcciphered." The "world" is understood
here as a burden. an intruding force. which the speaker wishes would simply leave. and
the linguistic metaphor of deciphering makes it clear that the world is not simply sense
data. but codified experience: language. The speaker wishes to either return to an
"untranslated" state, or be turned to (uniform, uncoded, meaningless) dust. It is strange to
compare this moment of panic with the intimation that the "brave soul" will fearlessly
cast away the "cherished" ladder of understanding. as it would appear that the speaker
never much cherished that apparatus at all.
The speaker in these poems veers wildly between the poles of confidence and
anxiety. on one hand asserting that language contains "truth" in some transcendent way.
and. on the other. chastising herself for being unable to apprehend that truth in any
meaningful way. Between these two opposites. it seems obvious that the "true" voice is
the anxious one. and the more confident one is the ideal. the imaginary. the objet a. Given
this reading, the fact that "Confessions" is written primarily in another voice.
Wittgcnstcin's. should be noted as a red flag. a symptom par excellence. The title of the
Carpenter 70
piece suggests the intimate. the telling of personal secrets. and yet it is written in italics.
mimicking the voice and language of the Tractatus Logico-Philosop hicus and the
Philosop hica l Investig ations. Zwicky writes
There is a generalform ofproposition:
This is how things stand A simple structure
Made ofnames and possibilit ies /ill' truth. (48)
and "Propositions are truth- function s oj! Assertions ofprimefacts . (49). essentially
engaging in a form of found poetry, The content of the Wittgensteinian portion of this
poem can be summarized as the following few ideas: I) language operates within a
matrix. in such a way that any idea that is expressed is only meaningful within a larger
context; 2) meaning is determined by use. and use is so ubiquitous as to bt: invisible. from
which it follows that 3) one who sees the pattern in all things. that " The world is all that
is the case" (55). will understand what things mean. Indeed, the Wingensteinian voice
breaks after stating that world is all that is the case. with an intrusion by the primary
speaker:
The silent path. The dappled shore.
l3lue.blut:t ht: watt:r.
Mist about the mountains. Oh
Can it be bomcu pcace this tcnse
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World swelling like an ache?
Poised as the mist begins to l ift .
Poised as the mist begins to l ift .
A reach.
This is the very answer. (55)
The Wiugcnsteinian voice is used with obvious reverence, without a trace of criticism or
irony. It is presented as monolithic. having been able to apprehend the world in its
entirety through language; the simplicity of the final statement, "The World is all that is
the case: ' is a mark of great wisdom, of having already grasped all that is the case. By
contrast. the following stanza is an incomplete attempt to do so; the repetition of "Poised
as the mist begins to lift " represents a stammer. a hesitance. the shuffle step of one afraid.
or unable. to complete a jump. The question. "can it be borne: ' refers to the ideal
presented in the previous line; it is the question of whether or not the speaker is able to
aspire to those great heights, and finally being unable to.
"Co nfcss ions.tthcn. is a recognition that a personal ideal is. in tact, a fantasy. If
this speech were delivered from an analysand on a couch, rather than it the context ofa
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poem, it would be clear that. what has occurred here is the "talking cure" : the patient has
talked through her own fantasy and been able to understand it for what it is. through the
process of articulating it for hersel f. The impersonation of Wittgenstein become s a potent
method for making the fantasy an object that can be understood from a separate vantage
point. which. when played through to its natural completion, is fi nally understood by the
analysand. The turning point is in the final line, a dramatic reversal: .'/\ reach.! That is the
very answer" is a reconciliation of the subject with its des ire. a recognition that though
she cannot reach what she seeks, the very act of desire represents its own worth. This is
where the lyric ideal asserts itself: and also where the title "Co nfess ions" begins to make
sense; it is where the subject makes peace with her own "sin: ' figured as insufficiency,
and recognizes the fantasy for what it is. It is when the speaker recognizes hersel fa s a
desiring subject, and begins to intimate the ramification s of her own wishes. It is when
the subject traverses this particular fantasy, paradoxically by projectin g it as someone
else's.
Wittge l/ste il/ Elegies is. on one hand. a celeb ration of Wiuge nstcin's philosophy
and the ideals that it represents. It is. on the other. an act offo rgiveness for failing to
attain its high standards. It is a potent mix ol'v language" as a subject matter. where
language is recognized both as an imprisonment. and as a way of setting one free. except
the mome nt of freedom occurs not in some transcendent moment of supra-linguistic bliss.
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but rather when the speaker recognizes that such a goal is not possible. but worth desiring
nonethele ss. This realization will form the basis of what Zwicky calls " living in the world
as ifit is home: ' and we can trace a psychoanalytic narrative in its formati on here: the
subject poses an ideal fantasy. exper iences anxiety as it fails to live up to it that ideal
(thereby glimpsing "the Real") and attempts to correct the problem in two ways.
bolstering the fantasy and chastising herself for her personal weakness in failing to live
up to it. It is only when the fantasy is separated from herself in an act ofve ntriloquism
that the subject glimpses her fantasy as extirnate, and is able to claim it for herself:
recog nizing the fantasy for what it is. Psychoanalytic ally. the subject needed to speak out
her symptom in order to solve it; lyrically. every part of the poem constructs itself
towards this eventual goa l. Either way. a philosophica l problem is understood in a deeply
personal way that exceeds the role of mere " logic."
5.2 T he New Room
First appraisal of Zwicky's second major collection, The Nell' Room, suggests a
move away from the intensely philosophic focus of the lViugel1.1'feil1 Elegies. its thematic
concerns being childhood. the family. and remembra nce. Zwicky breaks the work into
It)l1I' chap ters. which roughly correspond to I) the experience of growing up. filtered
through the memory of specific childhood sites and memories. 2) the act of leaving home.
3) the establishing ofa new. "adult't life, and 4) elegiac memor y. The lyric gestures of this
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long limn organization suggest rejec tion and forgiveness. a retur n to an origina l sta te that
is inform ed by the ve ry act o fre turning : effe ct ively. the process o f psychoanal ytical
anamne sis . The nar ra tive that emerge s in The Nell' Room follows the work of analy sis.
repre sen ting traumatic ma terial in bot h its original form and in new. "fu ll" speech tha t
allows to r recon cil iation.
The first. untitled chapter of The Nell' Room is composed of a series of rela ted
sma ll piece s that share certa in pass ing rese mb lances . Seve ral. such as "T he Back
Kitche n." "Th e West Room ." and "A t the Burn Barrel ." indi cate a pe rso na l geography.
their fam iliar form s suggesting part s of a house in whic h someone grew up . Others. like
" Pukaskwa. Jul y: A Driftwood Walking-St ick," "The Violin Case," and eve n " Potatoes,"
s im ilarly sugge st an inve nto ry o f objec ts fro m one's per sonal history. Evcn in the earliest
poem s. the se objects beg in to repre sent a kind of personal reflec tio n:
In the spare roo m of the new hou se
they 've put the mirrored che st of drawe rs
aga ins t the blank west al l.
Not o ld. no t eve n ugly - sty le less
like the interim o f ado lescence it once se rved. (15 )
There is self reproach in these line s. which is evident eve n before it is explicitly related to
the speaker's adolescence ; the "mi rrored" cabi ne t sugges ts the re fl ecte d image of the
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speaker. so that the description "n ot o ld. not even ugly" seems a kin d or d istan t sel l'
j udg ment. This ob lique sel l' appra isa l is present in other poems . such as" March
Nineteenth." where it is observed that
The longe r it takes us to get dre ssed. the more likely we wi ll notice what's been [I)
living
in the bac ks or drawers.oddly-coloured scarves,
cre ased snapshots and envelope s with ca ncel led stamps
o r hopelessly inade quate denom inat ion : a tic-dyed T-shirt. T icket stubs. ( 13)
This strange invent ory of vlost" items re flec ts the speaker's atten tion to repressed
memo ry. wh ich order one's psyche : after a ll. Lacan rem inds us that tha t the unconsc ious
insc ribes it self ' in childhood mem orie s and mon uments. Indeed. the speaker in "The West
Room " rea lizes this all too poten tly when she d iscovers the followi ng:
How the heart is like a roo m. never
quit e free agai n. thou gh empty:
forgotten pic ture-hook s.
unfaded patch of wallp aper whe re the g ilt edged portr a it hun g. ( 15)
The " fo rgot ten pictur e-h ooks" that once held the "gi lt ed ged por trait " arc the rem inder s o r
a past identit y. or more accuratel y. or a past ideal o r identit y. The reader should be war y
o r acc epting these picture-hook s as trul y forgo tten, beca use the hook s here suggest that
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which sinks into flesh and binds; one never quite forgets the idea of onese lf that is
learned from one's parents and community. and consequently the "subject" is always a
place "here one "ought" to be. The fact that the portrait itself is absent while the hooks
remain suggests the importance ofihe r spacc" of the subject, that even when the precise
image of what one should become is missing, there is still the sense of requirement: even
when the room is "empty," it still exerts a force on the speaker which creates an anxiety.
This recurring image of the "empty room" is allied with ideas of silence
throughout the collection; indeed, it would appear that in The Nell' Room, Zwicky
approaches her typical linguistic focus from its obverse. inspect ing the role of language in
relation to the subject from the point of its boundary. This approach is hinted at from the
very beginning, as the first piece. " High Summer," contains the lines
Wild rhubarb at the pig-barn
oilers nothing. monstrous leaves
flat poisonous. Unreadable. ( II)
Already. the speaker's attempt to "read" the objects of her childhood are frustrated by
silence: attempts to communicate break down. suppressing the "voice" of the past. This
muteness takes on a more cavernous dimension throughout the collection, as it becomes
the suppressed silence of traumatic repression. For instance, consider " Last Steps," which
may very well be the most violent poem Zwicky has ever written:
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T he way yo ur father shoves me up aga ins t the cell a r wa ll
to feci my breast s and does n't have to
warn me not to tell: no no
I'd never breath e a word . 'You're
such a disappointme nt. yo ur poor mother.
it'd kill her i f she knew .'
Beca use it's filled to burs ting :
pig's tee th. shrapne l. silent fallou t
comi ng home to roost. ['m mined. do n't
touc h me mother in the dar k; I'm set
on auto matic, unn amed thing that cuts
yo u in the nig ht. the razor hidden
in the apple o f your eye . (32)
The silence here is both enforce d and implicit. the threa t understood before it is even
uttered. The "m ined" ter ritory that it beco mes is the site o f vio lent traum a and self
loathin g. Thi s passage is unc haracteristica lly raw for Zwi cky. and undoub ted ly powerful ;
it also prov ides a crucial moment for allying her sense of the way language as a form of
li fe functio ns to Lucan' s theo ries regarding the same: w ithin this passage lies the oedipal
emerg ence into langua ge throu gh the suppress ion of desir e and the ex perience of syntax
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- the laws of grammar. of what can be said and how. are rigid and immovable.
The psychoanalytical approach demands that this poem be examined in terms of
its oedipal triad; the aggressor is. notably. characterized as a " father:' if not the speaker's
own. His aggression removes the young girl from her mother, making her something unlit
for touch. or unity. In Lacanian terms, this trauma reflects the subject's fir st separation.
the remova l li'OI11 pre-linguistic bliss to subjectivity experienced as lack. That lack is
experienced in this piece as something tainted or horrific (small wonder. considering the
particular way that it is enacted here). Although I do not wish to downplay the horror of
the molestation in this piece. Lacan's approach of Freud's oedipal relation as the "paternal
function" offers a powerful tool for recognizing the way that this piece reflec ts the rest of
Zwicky's oe uvre , a way of situating the theme of silence into her philosophic sense of
lyric. Bruce Fink explains in broad terms how for Lacan, the father acts as the initiation
into language: "The father - as name. noun. or o! - cancels out the mother (as
desiring or desired. neutralizes her. replaces her; loosely speaking. the father puts himself
as name or prohibition in her stead" (A Clinical Introduction. 91). Using the "typical"
parental roles to explain this process (Lucan does not require that the role of the mother
and the lather in this schema be played by their biological counterparts). l.acan suggests
that the father comes between the child and its mother as primary caregiver. forcing the
child to realize that the mother's desire is not entirely focused on the child. and forcing
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the child not to be fixated on the mother. Bruce Fink explains the way that meaning is
tied to this moment:
meaning is determined after the fact. and the child's relationship with its mother is
given meaning by the father 's prohibition; that meaning is, we might say, the "first
meaning." and it establishes a solid connection between a sternly enunciated
interdiction and an indeterminate longing for closeness (which is transformed into
desire for the mother as a result of the prohibition). The lirst meaning, the
fundamental meaning brought into being by the paternal metaphor, is that my
longing for my mother is wrong. [.. .] Assuming, however, that the father
has been assiduous (or simply lucky) enough to drive home to the child what is
prohibited, a link is established between language and meaning (reality as socially
constituted), between signifie r and signified, that will never break. (Clinical
IlIIroduclill11(3)
The experience of this separation from the mother is essentially traumatic as it is
envisioned by Lucan, and also the basis of language; the child learns his/her place within
the law, tying the signifier 01''1' to the experience of "me," which is felt as a loss of the
unified self, a "se paration" into two halves. All meaning stems from this initial
separation, such that Lucan describes it as the fJllil1l de cap ito n. or "button-tie": the stitch
ina fabric that allows itto hold in place. What should also be clear in this definit ion is
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that language and meaning arc social constructs that allow the subjec t to exist within a
particular culture (or. noting Zwicky's poems. a landscape). Thus, for Zwicky, the
traumatic silence is paradoxically the very imposition of language on subject. and the
attention paid to that repressed material is symptomatic of the longing for unity that
results from the primal repression that results from linguistic existence,
This relationship of this Lacanian observation to the workings of Zwicky's poems
in The Nell' Room becomes clear once one observes the way that silence is also closely
aligned with thc image of "the rules," the unspoken code of conduct that thc speaker
chafes against in the first chapter. Consider thc following passage from " Last Steps."
where thc narrator attempts to understand why her mother cries after receiving a piece of
clothing as a gili:
I still don't know
what happened wrong. It must have been
a birthday gi ft; said thank you twice and true
as true (although it was too short
and violent in cut and colour) so must have been
I didn't try it on. Or wear it long enough.
Lapse of alacrity? Your tears
and anger afte r supper. rules I didn't know
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and still can't construct. even my bed
would not accept that much
bewildered failure. (3 1)
This bewilde rment is precisely that of the unclear paternal funct ion, where thc child tries
in vain to align herself with the mother 's interests, and comes to learn of the presence of
"the rules" by way of her failure. When coupled with the threat of the mother's pain used
by the molester in "Las t Steps," this sense of the rules that determine one's behaviou r
emerges in an almost purely Lacanian light: they are that which separate the child from
union with the mother, the " language" of separation figured primarily as silence.
While si lence is almost uniforml y presented as traumatic in the lirst chapter of
The Ne ll' Room, over the course of the collection Zwicky attempts to redeem it. to bring it
into more sympathetic understanding. For instance, the unexplored territory of silence
also becomes the primary site the speaker of the second chapte r (" Leaving Home") has
for pursuing a reconciliation with a lather figure. The speaker addresses her lather in this
long poem, and begins to develop an understandin g of his life by attending to the
geographical deta ils of her childhood, transformin g the "unreadable" portions of her
childhood:
It is your silence in that story
that is etched: poplars on the east ridge
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against the black back of a storm.
l low you lay motionless through all that pain
without a sound. Did you make love
more than once in sixty years? (45)
Traumatic silence is here transformed into the source of a bond; the speaker notes the
way that her father too laboured under the yoke of repression (the sexual clement of this
passage becomes essential for this interpretation), and begins to speak to him with
something approaching understanding. Of course. this father is not the one who molested
the speaker of "Last Steps," but there is a degree of symmetry and associatio n between
these poems based on the role that is played by these two men. Furthermore. "Leav ing
l lome" represents a coming to terms with "the rules," which arc again associated with the
paterna l function; although the speaker asks with palpable anger. "Did you ever tell us
anything?" (41). she answers shortly with a response that more carefully measures what
she was taught. now taking on the responsibility for never having learned these
commandments:
And then the things I never quite learned:
how not to reply. or to reply with silence.
to eat with the stark deliberation
of the exhausted. twice each day
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to cut a hoiled potato with the concentration
of one whose knife and fork might suddenly
come alive. How to turn my hack.
stuffhands in pockets. amble off
The rules, (42)
In this moment of the poem. a sympathetic bond is formed : accusation becomes
understanding ofa shared burden, as the speaker realizes that this father figure (not the
one who performs the molestation. hut in terms of the unconscious association of
significrs. identical) also laboured under the yoke of an enforced silence. As much as
there is a lingering sense of abandonment in the "ambling oil:" there is also a recogn ition
of the reasons lor it. In effect, the speaker is "talking out" the trauma. learning to
associate the terrible silence with a formerl y antagonistic figure. "The rules" become
something other than simply a personal rejection. and actually form a basis lor sympathy
and interpersonal relation. "Leaving Home" works towards the effects of anamnesis,
letting the speaker pronounce her position to the lig ures of her personal history.
l'he third chapter of The IV!'II' Room arrives at the uncertain task of finding a home
within language. making it the portion of this collection that most resembles the rest of
Zwicky's oet1\'re. The speaker in "Empty Ilouses" muses from a more peaceful, mature
perspective than the ones within the previous chapters. suggesting the voice of one who
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has encountered those kinds of traumas and survived them:
Nothing prepares us
for the shape of speech and dwell ing.
the lit of homed to home.
Truth is strangest at its most abstract:
the clotted geometry ofc oat hangers.
knots in the kitchen string.
Houses hold us
as a pure philosophy holds dream. ("Empty Houses" 52)
This new perspective o ff ers an epiphany that could not be achieved in the previous
chapters: that language is a kind of home. a shelter as much as it is a restraint. Of note in
this passage is the persistent imagery of hooks that ties this piece to "March Nineteenth":
the "clo tted geometry or coat hangers" here o ff ers a kind of integrated identity that
supersedes the singular. threatening "picture hook" that once hung a portrait (and surely
clothing is more easily changed. less imposing. than the lace represented in a portrait !).
In this poem. the speaker encounters songs on the radio. and the peculiarities or a house's
structure. and asks "how else! would a home hold us?" (5 1). offering a less antagonistic
response to the limiting structures that the speaker in previous poems chafed against: she
recognizes that "nothing can prepare us" for this structure. but that there is no other way.
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In other words, "E mpty Houses' suggests someone who has made peace with the past.
while nevertheless acknow ledgi ng the kinds of wounds suggested in the previous poems
in the collection.
Zwicky further develops this theme of home through language in " Harvest" which
opens with the lines, "It is even in our human script. brcadcrumb s of the absent
imagination" (59). suggesting that the titular harvest is engraincd within language
(however much it may squander imagination. making its bounty "crumbs"). She further
muses. in a characteristic motif that
What Bacha nd Mozart heard were patterns
iterating. a balance struck
by light fal li ng through mist
on a hillside ofn ear-leafle ss bush,
the scattered pinnate order
or an ash leaf (6 1)
Ilcre, language provides the scaffolding on which "meaning" occu rs. The geogra phical
detail s that were unreadable at the beginning of The Nell' Room arc now seen with in
patterns recog nized by the minds of these master musicians. For Zwicky, this is the work
of lyric, the act of understanding things in a way that is not simply logical or analytical.
nor burdened by "the rules" that result from having a name. and ex isting under the
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that "there is no geography" is troubling when set against the rest of the col lection), the
Lacanian interpretation of thc piece shows how it is perfectl y in line with the other
poems: through this act of writing. Zwicky is defusing the concept of death. Even though
it appears that she is rejecting these metaphors. she is indeed working out the notion of a
mortal end through assoc iation: this observation is especially powerful if we recall that
for Zwicky. metaphor always ambivalcntly implies both "is" and "is not." Although
Zwicky is writing about a concept that cannot be contained linguistically. she is
channeling it in various phrases in such a way that lets it be approached. Just as "the skin
does actually hold the body in" (" Your Body" 79), the poems in this chapter contain
grief, and the traumatic space represented by death.
While 711eNe ll' Room appears to be a step away from Wittgenst ein Eleg ies '
primarily linguistic concerns. Lacan's theories of development show how Zwicky's
exploration of childhood trauma actually are of a kind with her more philosophic
approach to language. In fact. the poems in this collection are. as a whole. less guarded
than the rest of Zwicky's oeuvre. suggesting where the need for lyric apprehension might
originate: the experience of childhood trauma associated with what Lacan calls ··the
paternal function," Consequently. The Ne ll' Roo m o ff ers a crucial. Lacanian perspective
on the rest of Zwicky's work. embodying the symptoms of lyric desire.
Carpente r Sf
5.3 Slings for Relinquishing the Earth
Publi sh ed in 1996 , Songsfor Relinquishi ng the Earth wo n the Gove rno r Gen era l's
Awar d lor Poet ry. and marked Zwicky as one of Canada's most s ignifica nt cont em porary
poet s. T he poetr y cont ai ned wit hi n is mature and thou ghtful. but a lso playfu l in a way
that had bee n abse nt in Zwic ky's poeti c work to tha t po int ; when exa mi ned as a
co unte rpo int to Wiugenstein Elegies, Songs /or Relin quishing the Earth is remarkab ly
devoi d of que sti on s rega rd ing the bas is of meaning, while sti ll inte rested in que st ions o f
ling uis tic structure. Perhaps the most notabl e feature of Songs is that ther e is little to no
trace of the an xiet y that so cha rac terized the Eleg ies. Ju st as the " for" in the title imp lies,
the Songs}i) r Relinqui shing the Earth have the character o f instruction, offering an
exa mple of how one may indeed " let go ." What Laca nia n the ory can offer a readin g o f
this hook is prec ise ly wh at is bein g reli nquished: not the world , per se, but rather the need
fo r the wo rld to co nform to one 's own strict idea ls, which is (so me w hat paradoxicall y)
ma rked by the ability to em brace fant asy. In o the r word s, Songsfin: Relinquishing the
Earth has the es sentia l character o f havin g a lready traversed the fanta sy.
T hro ug hou t Songs, there is an atmosphe re of relaxed co ntem plation o f the
speaker's yo ung er, more foo lish se lf, temp er ed wi th a heal th y appreciati on of hcr
a ttendant idea lism. :' ( have wa nte d the re to be/no sto ry." remem ber s the speake r in "Th e
Geology o f No rway," " I ha ve wa nted /the geo logy o f light " (32). Indeed, the vo ice here
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could easily be remembering herself as that who spoke in lViI/gel/ steil/ Elegies:
How else to anchor memory? l wanted language
to hold me still, to be a rock.
I wanted to become a rock myself. l thought
if I could lind. and say,
the perfect word, I'd nail
mind to the world, and lind
release. (34-5)
This self-contemplation leads into an assertion. "The hand moving is the hand thinking:'
which conceptually allies "thought" with motion. or process. Rather than attempting to
"nail" down the self to the mind. the speaker is now comfortable with the flux of thought.
Importantly. though. she wishes to make known that " flux" docs not equal the absence of
"Truth":
And the fact is, the earth is not a perfect sphere.
And the fact is. it is half-liquid.
And the fact is, there arc gravitational anamolies [ .. )
And the fact is.
the fact is.
and you might think the fact is
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we will never get to the bottom of it.
but you would be wrong.
There is a solid inner core. (33).
But what is this "inner core"? The speaker reminisces more. and provides an answer.
once again using the image of "na ils." but inverted in such a way that rather than fi xing to
the solid. unmoving ground. they attach one to the fluid sky:
The sound of wind in leaves,
that was what puzzled me. it took me years
to understand that it was music.
Into silence. a gesture.
A sentence: that it speaks.
This is the mystery: meaning.
Not that these folds of rock exist
but that their beauty. here.
now. nails us to the sky. (34)
Once again. "meaning" is allied with the non-static. and it is "beauty." an aesthetic
category. that provides meaning. Lyric is treated as a subject here. and it is described as
providing meaning by way of offering a cohesive form to the experience of nature. ,\ s
well. one should note that the image of the "sound of leaves" becoming "music" is the
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transformation ofnatural vs ilcn cc" into human "gesture": it is this transformation that
will inform the collection as a whole.
The title of this collection betrays its thematic focus in a way that is so
transparent as to be invisible: these poems arc to be regarded as songs, the metaphor of a
song having "meaning' being a vital example for Zwicky's concept of "lyric: ' The first
entry in the selection, "Open Strings," draws us into a structuring musical metaphor that
will last throughout the work. Zwicky begins by listing four notes: EADG, the open
strings of a violin. In doing so, Zwicky "sounds out" the tuning of an instrument.
calibrating the tone of what is to come: after all, the first thing any musician does when
picking up his/her instrument is play the opcn strings, making certain that they arc in
harmony.13 This poem exhibits the belief that Zwicky outlines in Lyric Philosophy, that
imagination is required to "see-as," suggesting qualities for the notes that transform them
into something human, in an intcntionul "lyric fallacy," transforming the reverberation of
strings vibrating against air into something distinctly and inexorably human. Zwicky
completes this transformation by suggesting that
Open strings
arc ambassadors from the republic ofs ilence.
iJ Although Zwicky docs not pursue the metaphor in rhis directiont would like to point out that the
process of tuning requries a rdoubling't ofno tes. the playing oft 11'0 tones repetitively between two
strings. Thus we observe the kind of repetition that Lacan suggests is au vcnrpty ing' t ofco nrent.
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They arc the name of that moment when you realize
clearly. for the first time,
you will die. ( 10)
Once again. Zwicky "closes" the structure of her poem by leaving a loose thread; the
human element of the music ultimately belies the fact that these notes represent the
subtor supra)-liminal space of human experience. which. in Lacanian tcrms, is the Real.
Once again. the content of Zwicky's writing bears certain similarities to Lucan's theories;
however. Lucan reminds us that the truth of a statement is not in its content, but in its
form. Here \ VI: sec two structuring impulses: the desire to " fi II in the blanks," but also to
let them remain. The speaker of this poem draws on experience and offering stories that
may account for the "ambassadors of silence," but at the same time this same creative
mind recognizes that this effort is. in one sense. futile. as silence itselfco mmunicates
something vital. There is a tension here; Zwicky seemingly undermines the imaginative
play brought forth in the body poem in its final stanza. IIowevcr, the latter is not seen to
refute the former; both possibil ities linger in each other's presence. highlighting the
internal tension of metaphor in the very structure of the poem. The communicative force
of the poem most assuredly rests in this metaphor that resides at the level of the poem's
construction.
The metaphor of music runs throughout Songsfor Relinquishing the Earth. and it
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is used to highlight the compositional aspect of tholight and meaning. This observation is
clear in the central work of the piece. the long poem rK ant and Bruckner: Twelve
Variations." In this selection, the lives and works of philosopher Immanuel Kant and
composer Anton Bruckner arc direct ly compared. and made equivalent. highlighting the
way in which metaphysics resembles the work of composition . Zwicky segues into this
poem with a prose introduction that is itselfa part of the poem. already attempting to
display the "i llusion" of division. In the beginning, she compares the two men directly.
finding direct correspo ndences: "Neither man produced much of anything until middle or
late-middle age. and then what each produced was massive: dense. huge. and
astonishingly intricate. Both were. by contrast with their work, nafl fs: devou tly religious.
devoted to their mothers. anxious not to offend" ( 17). The psychological profiles of these
two men begin to emerge in these lines, and morcso as Zwicky relates that " Both were
virgins. though apparently heterosexual: and eccentric" (17). From these points of
comparison. Zwicky begins to scatter pieces of trivia about the two men in such a way
that their j uxtaposition suggests similarity: "Kant didn't like music. except for brass hands
- the basis of Bruckner's orchestral palette. Both were early risers [.. . 1 and extremely
popular as teachers. Both were obsessive revisers" (17). She then adds that " Bruckner
had a nervous breakdown during which his numcromaniac tendencies became very
pronounced": this piece of historical trivia regarding Bruckner is not given any equivalent
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in Kant's history. but parallels drawn throughout the piece suggest that Kant. in his own
way. suffered from a similar fault. This implicit comparison. the result ofrepetitive
j uxtaposition. is the key of Zwicky's variations. wherein the history and oeu vre ofa
composer become directly related to that of a philosopher. placing the organizational
precepts of music onto those of analytic philosophy.
While Zwicky confidently performs this comparison. itselfa lyric form of
aesthetic organization. she also is careful to leave a loose thread that destabilizes the
absoluteness of her conceptual framework. One of Zwicky's central motifs in Songsfor
Relilllluis hillg the Earth, and especially " Kant and Bruckner," is "polyphony.' Zwicky's
piece revolves around a poetic construction that wishes to suggest multiple voices
speaking in tandem. While she uses a similar technique in her previous co llcc tions. !" this
is the first collection where the technique is referred to within her poetry. She writes in
"'Kant and Hruckncr" that "[tjhe voice. to usc a highfalutin term. is polyphonic - it
moves around a lot. Sometimes. it is Kant's. sometimes Bruckner's, sometimes that of
both. sometimes that of an observer" (19). The question may be raised in regards to this
piece: is the effect of "polyphony" truly that of many voices. or of a single voice
adjusting itself? l.acan provides a clear answer. and some perspect ive on the piece: "it
I I See, in particular, the Wittgensteinian "intrusions" inv arious pocmso rThc WiI/RClISlciIlEll'gics .a nd
"Mourning Song" in ThcNc\l' RvolII, \I'hich is written in such a way as to be recited by two voices
simultaneously,
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suffices to listen to poetry. which Saussure was certainly in the habit of doing. for a
polyphony to be heard and for it to become clear that all discourse is aligned along the
several staves ofa musical score" ("I nstance of the Letter," 419). What Lacan indicates in
this passage is that all discourse is, in a sense. polyphonic, i nso far as parts remain hidden
and its internal components resonate with each other (and it is indeed interesting to note
that the very metaphor Lacan uses to describe the eff ect is that of musical composition).
Consequently. while polyphony is indeed a poetic device. it can only convey a single
discourse; this is. o f course, Zwicky's technique, inculcatin g a sense of resonance
between "voices" in a single work . She foregrounds the relationship of sing le voices to
the greater whole in an introduction to one of this book's longer pieces:
Amo ng the observer-voices, there is one that deserves special mention in
connection with the conventions governing the composition of sets of classical
variations. Not infrequently, especially in the works of IIadyn and Beethoven. the
sublime and the ridiculous arc deliberately ju xtaposed -the meditative tcnsion is
relieved by a scherzo. This goo fi ng off usually occurs abou t two-thirds or three-
quarters of the way through. It appears here in Variation S, (19)
Freud writes in "Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious" that "Caricature, parody
and travesty [. . . j arc directed against people and objec ts which lay claim to authority and
respect, which arc in some sense 'sublime" (26 1). in a practical attemp t to loosen the grip
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of those authoritative forces upon us. Compositionally. Zwicky is doing precise ly what
Freud observes. frustrating the piece's lyric sense by short circuiting it even within the
piece: the "scherzo" is the defusal of the poetic structure. its shunting into fundamentally
less threatening. less "sublime't territory; any Lacanian analyst would identify it as the
moment that the unconscious presents itself. The function of the scherzo here is that it
exhibits the fantasy of polyphony, showing the composi tional aspect of one voice
impersonating many others. The key difference between the polyphony of this piece and
that of lVillge llstein Elegies is observed through the scherzo , as it is clear in the use of this
flourish that Zwicky is not abdica ting her voice for another. instead del ibera tely
displaying her authorial control; what is shown. the "t ruth" that is glimpsed. is the speech
oft he subject itself. In other words. that which Lacan would describe as full speech. The
speaker is letting us know that she is there. and while there is an emphasis on the fantasy
being presented. it is ultimately defused, shown to be the work of one person. The fant asy
is engaged. but there is lillie effo rt to avoid piercing the veil of its truth: rather. the truth
of the fanta sy is the fac t of the speaker.
Similar to lVillgellsteill Eleg ies. Songs./i)I' Relinquishing the Earth is a cerebral
work. approaching language and the way that one exists within it. As a coun terpoint to
that earlie r work. it is clearly Zwic ky's own. a more confident arrangement of voices that
indicates the author's own thoughts. without intrusion. without fear of losing one's voice,
Carpenter 97
The metaphor of musical composition reflects Zwicky's own control as a writer, and an
easier relationship with language virtually devoid of anxiety: where Zwicky once inserted
dark ruminations on the meaning of language. she is now content to insert scherzos.
playing in the spaces that were once foreboding. It is in this volume of poetry that
Zwicky enacts her conviction that " imagination is required to "see-as: ' the speaker so
content to impart truth value to the world around her that she is able to jo ke about about
it. gently poke fun at herself. In l.acanian terms, the speaker has learned to work out the
anxiety by creating a new fantasy that can confront the limits of the previous one: where
there was once concern that what we could name was not really there. there is a
willingness to embrace the idea that by engaging with an object, one forms it. creates its
truth. The speaker oiSongsfo r Relinquishing the Earth learns that the fact of the matter
is fantasy, and that there is nothing fantastical about that.
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C unclus iun
Jan Zw icky's last majo r co llecti on of poe try. Thirty-se venSmall Songs am i
Thirteen Silences. was pu bli shed in 2005 by Ga spc rau Press. the same publisher that
pro duced her 1I'lsdo/l/ and Metaphor. She has produ ced a chapbook publi shed s ince
(2009 's The Art ofthe Fugue). but I will p lace an em phas is on the adj ec tive " las t:' as
ther e is the sens e within that work that it is. ind eed , final ; her term "silence s" is apt for
the co llec tion, who se sho rt poem s most resemble the haiku in sty le, if not in form . Go ne
arc the remini scen ce s o f The Nell' Room. or the histori ca l recreations of Wittgenstein
Eleg ies or .)'ongs jiJr Relinquishing the Earth; inste ad, Zwicky is cont ent to de scr ibe the
momen t. to let the passin g instanc es o f a qui et li fe prov ide their ow n lyric qu ali ty. It is.
per ha ps . no t he r best book o f poet ry. no r her most inte resting , a lthough it is docs hold
bo th wi sd om and pleasure . Indeed , one is tempted to desc ribe the poe ms as " sa tis fied ."
wi lling to be exactl y what they are withou t reac hi ng for so me sublime goa l o f
tran s formation o r reconci liation. T hey arc. by Zw icky' s own sta nda rds. a pe rfect
rea liza tio n o f the wisdom a fforde d by lyric comp re hen sion: having strived so hard to
g rasp the be yon d, the poet lea rns to ceas e seeking. to becom e co ntent wi th one's
im per fec t rela tionship to the O the r. to the Eterna l.
Read as an a rc, Zwicky's book s o f poetr y enac t the developm ent she fo resees for
the poet -phil osoph er in Ly ric Philosophy : the y al so perform the actio ns of
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psychoanalytical anamnesis. eventually "traversing the fantasy" in such a way that the
philosopher no longer has to "settle the score" with the other; the kind of desire
represented by the objet a of aphanasis or ecstatic union simply fades away. and the
subject becomes satisfied with its own castration. Zwicky manages to. in the absence of
any I.acanian influence. enact the very work of analysis across her body of work. The
very act of writing poetry. of thinking lyrically. develops towards this goal: the poet
Zwicky becomes is perhaps the best example of the worth of this enterprise.
It seems readily apparent that Zwicky. in her poetry. is performing a kind of
philosophical surgery upon herself, sorting through the half formed ideas and attempting
to organize them in a way that resembles epiphany, thereby suggesting the lyric. To do so.
she had to identify "alive" metaphors and writing. and isolate them from instances or
mere codified speech. In this way, the poet's car for her craft most resembles the analyst's
ear for the patient; it is a matter of discerning what, in utterance. "lives," what gives away
the secrets ofthe subject's desire. of her relationship to the other. of her position in the
greater scheme of things: or "truth."
It is really rather extraordinary that two such disparate thinkers working in
isolation on the subject of language and its relation to truth and the subject would share
such commonalities. It is far less extraordinary that, to outward appearance. they would
appear so very different in their approaches. It is lamentable that such differences would
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prevent a dialogue 1"0111 occurring between these two figures, but I hope that this thesis
has gone some small distance in rectifying that sad fate. Perhaps the unifying clement
between Zwicky and l.acan is their outsider status, the fact that by working in poetry and
psychoanalysis, they arc not typically considered by mainstream philosophy: perhaps
because of this, they are able to showcase its faults, flaws, and presuppositions, In any
case, both Zwicky and Lucan comment profoundly on thought. language and meaning,
and both arc worth examining for their philosophical and literary merits; it is remarkable
how coextensive that particular commonality truly is,
Carpenter 101
Bihliography:
Altieri, Charles. " Wittgcnstcin on Consciousness and Language: A Challenge to
Derridean Literary Theory." AILN 91.6 (Dec. 1( 76): 1397-1423.
Barzilai. Shuli. " Borders of Language: Kristeva's Critique of Lucan." PMLA 106.2 (Mar.,
1(9 1): 294-305.
Boothby. Richard. Freud as Philosopher: Metapsychol ogy After Lucan. New York:
Routledge, 200 1
Bouveresse, Jacques. Wiugenstein Reads Freud Trans. Carol Cosman. New Jersey:
Princeton UP, 1995.
Bringhurst, Robert. Thinking and Singing . Poetr y and the Practice ofPhilosop hy.
Toronto: Cormorant Books. 2002.
Chiezu, Lorenzo. Subject ivity and Otherness : A Philosoph ical Reading ofLacan.
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 2007 .
David-Menard. Monique and Brian Massumi, " Lacanians Against Lucan." Social Text 6
(Autumn, 1( 82): 86-111 .
de Ccrtcau, Michel and Marie Rose-Logan. " Lucan: An Ethics of Speech."
Representutions 3 (Summer. 1983): 2 1-39.
Dickinson. Adam. "Lyric Ethics: Ecocriticism, Material Metaphoricity, and the Poetics of
Carpenter 102
Don Mckay and Jan Zwicky.' Can adian Poetr y 55 (Fall. 2004 - Winter 2005):
34.
Evans. Dylan. ·/n Introductory Dict ionary ofLacanian Psychoanalysis. New York:
Routledge. 1996.
Farman. Abou, "To Know the Pine." Review. Books in Canada 35.1 (Jan/Feb. 2006): 30-
3 1.
Fink, Bruce. A Clinical Introduction to Lacan ian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Techn ique .
Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1997.
---. Fundamentals ofPsychoanaly tical Technique : A Lacanian Approachfor
Practicioners. New York: \V.W. Norton, 2007.
---. l.acan to the Letter. Readin g l~cri/s Closely . St. Paul: University or Minnesota Press.
2004.
---. The Local/ian Subject: Be/w een Language and Jouissance. Princeton. N.J.:
Princeton UP, 1995.
Freiberger, Erich D. " 'Heads I Win. Tails You Lose': Wittgenstcin, Plato, and the Role or
Construction and Deconstruction in Psychoanalysis and Ethics." Lucan in
America. Ed. Jean-Michel Rabate. New York: Other Press, 2000.
Freud. Sigmund, Beyond the Pleasu re Principle. Trans.. New york: WW Norton.
---. Civili za tion and 1/.1' Discont ents. Trans. David McClintlock. New York: Penguin
Carpenter 103
Books. 2004.
---. The Psychopatho logy ofEver yday Life. Trans. Alan Tyson. New York: WW Norton,
1960.
---. The Int erp reta tion of D rew ns. Trans. Dr. A.A. Brill. New York: The
Modern Library, 1994.
-r - . "The Unconscious," The Standard Edition ofthe Complete Psych ological II'Ilrks 4
Sig mund Freud, Volume X lV (/ 9 f.1-19 /6): 0 11 the Hist ory ofthe Psych o-Analytic
Movement, Pap ers Oil Me tapsychology and Other 1Vorks. Trans. James Strachey.
London: Hogarth Press, 1974. 159-215
Furlani. Andre. "Jan Zwicky: Lyric Philosophy Lyric." Ca nadia n Lit erature 191 (Winter
20(6) : 4X-59.
Gallop. Jane. "The Ladies' Man." Diacritics (Winter. 1( 76): 28-34.
l larari. Roberto. 11011' Jam es Joy ce Mude His Name: II Reading ofThe Filial LaCl11/.
Trans. Luke Thurston. New York: Other Press, 2002.
Ilatch. Ronald B. Rev. of Wi/lg ellst d ll Elegies. by Jan Zwicky. Universi ty ofToronto
Quarterly 57.1 ( 1987): 41.
Irigaray. Lucc, Key Writ ings. New York: Continuum. 2004.
---. iii Speak is Neve r Neu tra l. Trans. Gail Schwab. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Kellog, David. "PerlofT's Wittgcnstein: \V(h)ither Poetic Theory'!" Diacr itics 16 .3/1
Carpenter )04
(Autumn-Winter 1996): 67-S5.
Kristeva, Julia. Desire i ll l.auguage: A Semio tic Approa ch 10 Litera ture lind Art. Trans.
Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez. Ed. con S. Roudiez.
York: Columbia UP. 19S0.
-- -. Re\'(}!lIIiOIl ill Poeti c Language. Trans. Margaret Waller, New York: Columbia UP.
19S2.
Kurzwell, Edith. "Jacques Lacan: French Freud." Theory 1I1ldSociet y 10.3 (May, 19SI):
419-4 3S.
l.acan. Jacques. !;'crils: A Selectio n. Trans. Alan Sheridan . New York: Norton, 1977.
---. Oil Feminine Sexu ality: the Limits ofLove 1I1/(! Kilowleclge. Trans. Bruce Fink.
York: l orton, 1998.
-r--. l.e J \ ~l'Ihe Individual du Nel'I"IJ.I"I!, OU, Poesi e et Veri le dan s !1I Nevrose . Paris: Editio ns
du Seuil, 2007.
---. Other Side ofPsychoanalysis. Irans, Russell Grigg, New York: Norton. 2007.
---. Scminuire 23: l.e Sinthome. Paris: Editions du Seuil. 1976.
---. Speech and l.angu age i ll Psychoanalysis. Trans.Anthony Wilden.
Baltimore : Johns Hopkins UP. 1968.
---. Th e Ethics ofPsycha analysis. Trans. Dennis Porter, New York: Norton, 1997.
---. The Four Fundam ental Concepts ofPs ycho -Analysis. Trans. Alan Sheridan . New
Car penter 105
York: orton. 1978 .
--- . The !.allg uage ofThe Self : The Funct ion ofLangu age in Ps ychoana lysi s. Trans.
Anthony Wilden. Haltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1968.
--- . Television. Paris: r~ditions du Seuil, 1974.
Lilburn. Tim. Goi ng Hom e. Toronto: Anansi. 2008.
--- . Living ill the Wu rld as Ifit \l'ere Hom e: Essays. Dunvegan, Ont: Cormorant. 1999.
Mehlman. Jeffrey. "The " Floating Signifier": From Levi-Strauss to Lacan. Yale French
Studies 48 (19 72) : 10-37 .
Mellard. James. Beyond Lacan. New York: New York UP. 2006.
Pcrlolf Marjorie. "Towards a Wittgensteinian Poetics," Co ntemporary Literature 33 .2.
(Summer. 1(92): 191-21 3.
---. lVilfgCIl.\'fcill ~\· Ladder: Poetic Lallgua ge and th e Strange ness ofthe Ord inary.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1996.
Rabate, Jea n- Michel. Jacqu es Luca n: Ps ych oan alysi s and the Subject ofLiterature . New
York: Palgravc, 200 1.
Ragland-Sullivan. Ellie and Mark Bracher. eds, LaCllII and the Subject ofLang uuge . New
York: Routledge. 1991.
Rimmon-Kcnan. Shlomith. "The Paradoxical Status of Repetition." Poeti cs Today 1.4
(Summer 1(80): 151-159 .
Carpenter 106
Rozema. David. ··7h IC!a ! II.\· Logico-Philosophicus: A " Poem" by Ludwig Wittgcnstcin."
Journal ofthe History ofIdeas 63 .2 (April 2(02): 345 -363 .
Sanger. Pete. "A lmost Blind with Light . . : Jan Zwicky:' Antigo nish Revi ew 136
Schaub. Dannicllc. Readin g Auth ors Read ing : Canadian Authors ' Reflect ions.
Edmonton: University of Alberta UP. 2006 .
Stewart. Stanley. " Was Wittgenstcin a Closet Literary Critic?" New Literary Histor y 34. 1
(Winter 2( 03) : 43-57 .
Stoltzfus. Ben. l.acun & Litera ture : Purloined Pre texts. New York: State U of
New York P. 1996 .
Winnubst, Shannon. "Exceeding IIcgel and Lacan: Different Fields of Pleasure within
Foucault and I r i garay. " /~l'pa/ia 14. 1 (Winter. 1999): 13-37.
Wiugenstein, Ludwig. On Cer tainly. Trans. G.E.M. An scornb c and G.I!. Von Wright.
New York: Harper Torc hbook s, 1972.
--- . Phi losophical Invest igat ions. Frans. G.E.M. Anscornbe. Malden.
MA: Blackwell. 200 1.
--- . TIll' BIlle and BI'IIl\'n Books : Preliminary Studiesfor the Phllosophical Investigutions.
Malden: Blackwell. 1969 .
-- - . 7h1Cta ! IIS Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. C.K. Ogden. New York: Dover Publications.
1999.
Ca rpenter 107
Zizek, Slavoj . Enjoy lil/lr Symp tom]: Jacques l.acan in Holly wood and Out. New York.
Rou tledge . 1992.
---. 11011' to Read LaC(/f1. New York: Granta, 2006 .
---. Lucan: The Sile nt Partn ers. New York : Verso, 2006.
---. Looking , hrry: l In Introdu ction to Jacques Lucan Through Pop ular Culture.
Zwicky. Jan. "E pis temology." Antigo nish Review 136 (Winter. 2004) : 15.
---. "Fre ud's Metapsychology and the Culture of Philosoph y." Canadian Jour nal oj
Philosop hy 25 ( 1999): 2 11.
---. Lyric Philosop hy. Toro nto: U of Toro nto P. 1992.
---. ,'-,ongs For Relinquish ing the Earth. London, Ont. : Brick Books, 199 8.
---. The AI" of The Fugue. Montr eal : Valium Soc iety for Arts and Letters Education.
2009 .
---. Thirty-seven Small Songs & Thirteen Silences . London , Ont.: Brick Books, 2005 .
---. Willgellsteill Elegies . Londo n. On t.: Brick Book s, 1986.
---. " Wilderness and Agriculture." In the Agora : the Public Face ofCanadian
Philosophy. Ed. A.D. Irvine. Toro nto: Univers ity of Toro nto UP. 2006. 24-29 .
Wisdolll & Metaphor Kernville, NS: Gaspc rcau Press, 2003 .
Ca mbridge . Mass: ~ I IT Press, 1991.




